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Ownership structure, Voting and Risk
September 16, 2011
Abstract
We analyze the determinants of ownership structure in firms when conflicts of
interest on risk arise endogenously via different ownership stakes and firm decisions
are made through majority voting. A large block is chosen to incentivize monitoring.
Because a large blockholder holds a large share of the firm, he is averse to risky
investing. This generates a conflict of interest with dispersed shareholders. Mid-size
blockholders, voting in favor of middle of the road projects, mitigate the conflict
of interest. Depending on monitoring costs, voting institutions and the nature
of the industry, three types of ownership structures arise: one large shareholder
with a fringe of dispersed owners, multiple large shareholders and fully dispersed
shareholders.
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1 Introduction
Much of the literature on corporate governance has focused on the role of large share-
holders in resolving free riding problems that arise when there is dispersed ownership.1
There is, however, a vast empirical literature documenting that ownership structure
takes very diverse forms, ranging from one large shareholder, to multiple intermediate
sized shareholders and fully dispersed structures. In the US, 67% of public firms has
more than one blockholder with a participation larger than 5%, while only 13% are
widely held and 20% has only one blockholder (using the database in Dlugosz, Fahlen-
brach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006)). In eight out of nine largest stock markets of the
European Union the median size of the second largest voting block in large publicly
listed companies exceeds five percent (data from the European Corporate Governance
Network).2 In this paper we provide a novel theory why blockholders may emerge. A
larger block implies increased voting rights (and hence an increased ability to affect
important firm decisions) but a less diversified portfolio. We investigate how poten-
tial conflicts of interest between shareholders on the risk profile of a firm affect the
ownership structure of a firm when majority voting is the mechanism for aggregating
shareholder preferences. We show that depending on model parameters a variety of own-
ership structures may emerge, including the often observed multiple large blockholders.
Several novel empirical predictions are derived. Our theory links firm characteristics
(such as investment size, industry characteristics and minority shareholders participa-
tion) to its ownership structure. Moreover, the model makes predictions about how a
firm’s ownership structure affects its choice of project risk.
Empirically, the literature on ownership structure and risk is sparse. To the best
of our knowledge, the issue of how potential conflicts of interest can affect a firms
1See e.g. Grossman and Hart (1980), Stiglitz (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1993), Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994), Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997), Pagano
and Ro¨ell (1998), Bolton and Von Thadden (1998), Maug (1998)).
2La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) find that 25% of the firms in various countries
have at least two blockholders while Laeven and Levine (2008b) find that 34% (12%) of listed Western
European firms have more than one (two) large owners where large owners are considered shareholders
with more than a 10% stake.
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ownership structure has not been studied empirically. The question of how ownership
structure affects risk taking has been studied by Laeven and Levine (2008a) who analyze
data for more than 250 privately owned banks across 48 countries, and show that banks
that have well diversified shareholders, are likely to take more risks. In the case of
non-financial firms, similar patterns are observed between ownership structure and risk
decisions, e.g. (Carlin and Mayer (2003) and John (2008)). While the exact direction in
which ownership structures affect risk changes across regulatory environments, the main
lesson to be drawn from the empirical literature is that there is a close link between
important risk decisions of the firm and its ownership structure. In this literature
several questions remain unanswered: what is the mechanism which determines the link
between ownership structure and important decisions of the firm? In the presence of
multiple blockholders, whose preferences do decisions reflect? Given the apparent cost of
block ownership, what exactly is the governance role of a second third etc. blockholder?
Our paper is an attempt to answer these questions.
Formally, suppose there is an initial owner or founder of a new firm who needs to
raise capital to finance a project. The initial owner of the firm cannot commit to take a
value enhancing action, e.g. monitoring the manager, unless he has a sufficiently large
stake (e.g. Maug (1998)). The higher the cost of monitoring, the higher the minimum
threshold of shares to which the initial owner must commit.3
The initial owner raises capital through issuing shares and/or debt. Outside in-
vestors who are ex-ante identical decide their share ownership conditional on the offer
price set by the initial owner. Both the owner as well as other investors are risk averse,
but their preferences on risk/return depend only on the size of their stakes in the firm:
the larger the stakes the lower the risk/return trade-off they prefer. Once the ownership
structure is established, shareholders vote on the riskiness of the investment projects
that the firm subsequently undertakes. At the time of buying shares therefore, investors
3In general the initial owner may hold a larger stake because of other reasons, e.g. signaling his faith
in the firm to outside investors, or because of complementarities between the the entrepreneur and the
value of the firm (e.g. the case of Sun Microsystems and Apple). This would not change the main
results of the paper.
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face a trade off between holding a diversified portfolio and having little influence on the
firm’s decisions, or buying more shares, maybe holding a suboptimal portfolio, but in-
fluencing the firm’s decisions. This trade-off matters because the initial owner prefers
less risky and lower return projects due to his large initial stake, while outside investors
would ideally want the highest risk/return, creating an endogenous conflict of interest.4
We show that some investors buy mid-sized blocks, so as to guarantee (by their
votes) that the risk/return profile of the firm is higher than what would be chosen by
the initial large shareholder alone. Paradoxically, of course, when they do buy a larger
fraction of shares, their preferences move closer to those of the initial large shareholder.
Our main results are that for low values of the monitoring cost, which correlates
with low potential conflicts of interest on risk, we should observe a dispersed ownership
structure, while for very high values of monitoring costs (high potential conflicts) we
should observe one large shareholder with a fringe of dispersed owners. Finally, for
intermediate values of the initial owner’s monitoring costs (conflicts on risk profile exist
but are not too big), multiple blockholders should be observed. Other important de-
terminants of ownership structure are voting institutions, the size of the firm and the
degree of minority protection.
We show that in turn, ownership structure affects the decisions on risk: a single large
shareholder is associated with lower risk (as the large shareholder makes all decisions)
while multiple large shareholders are associated with higher risk and higher firm value.
Mid-sized blockholders play a role in mitigating the conflicts of interests between the
largest shareholder, who prefers to reduce risk at the expense of value and liquidity
shareholders who are value maximizing. Moreover, our model predicts that when there
are multiple blockholders, it is not necessarily the largest shareholder who is pivotal for
the risk taking decision.
4The effects on the risk choices when a controlling shareholder is less diversified can be seen in the
choices of the Swedish bank Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB). The controlling shareholder, the
Wallenberg family, has a big part of its wealth invested in the bank. The bank’s approach is to be
prudent as “sometimes life can turn sour”. For this reason it faced the financial crises with a lot of cash
which helped it to perform better than its’ peers and in general than the stock market (The Economist,
2009). For a more systematic study see Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2009).
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This is broadly consistent with what the empirical literature has found on the re-
lationship between ownership structure, firm risk and value : Carlin and Mayer (2000;
2003) show that firms with more dispersed ownership tend to invest in higher risk
projects, like R&D and skill intensive activities. Laeven and Levine (2008b) find that
firms with several blockholders have a higher Tobin’s Q than firms with only one big
shareholder. On the other hand, Lehmann and Weigand (2000), Volpin (2002), (Faccio,
Lang, and Young, 2001), Maury and Pajuste (2005), Gutierrez and Tribo (2004) find
that multiple blockholders lead to higher firm value.
Other important determinants of ownership structure in our model are the nature
of the industry -innovative (high potential returns and risk) or mature (low risk, low
return, less potential for conflicts of interest) as well as the legal framework around
voting institutions and the way they function. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in
more mature sectors it is more common to see families in control of firms. Becht,
Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009) suggest that activism by large investors is much more
common in the UK than in US, because of the legal and regulatory structure as well as
different voting institutions in the two countries.
The literature on explaining ownership structure is sparse. Zwiebel (1995) was the
first to explain the existence of multiple intermediate sized blocks. He argues that when
wealth constraints limit block ownership, multiple blockholders may form a controlling
coalition. Investors can get partial benefits of control based on their initial endowments.
We depart from Zwiebel (1995) in endogenizing (i) the amount of wealth each investor
puts in the firm and (ii) endogenize control benefits through the firm’s decision on risk.
This allows us to generate new empirical implications regarding firm characteristics and
ownership structure.
In a more normative vein, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) show that multiple large
shareholders can reduce expropriation of minority shareholders and ownership structure
can thus commit the initial owner to more efficient decisions. Their work applies to
closely held corporations characterized by an absent resale market for shares. In contrast
our paper analyzes ownership structures in publicly held corporations where trading is
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allowed. Gomes and Novaes (2001) consider the role of veto power by blockholders
instead of considering majority rule as voting mechanisms as we do. The shared control
among a few large shareholders may be an efficient way to protect minority shareholders
reducing the extraction of private benefit of control. Their emphasis is however on the
hold up problems induced by the veto power of blockholders and they derive empirical
implications on the effects of veto power.
Noe (2002) and Edmans and Manso (2008) look at the link between multiple block-
holders and financial markets. In Noe (2002) blockholders can trade and profit from
private information but because price movements have no disciplining role, ’exit‘ threat
by selling shares does not have any effect on managerial effort. In Edmans and Manso
(2008) instead, share price movements have a disciplining role and the threat of exit
induces the manager to exert more effort. They conclude that share price movements
are more effective than direct governance tools. Our paper focuses instead on how de-
cision are taken in relation to the role of activist blockholders. The assumption that
blockholders are activist on policy decisions of the firm is confirmed e.g. by Helwege,
Intintoli, and Zhang (2011) who find that institutional investors prefer to affect firm pol-
icy through activism and voting rather than acting through the threat of exit. Yermack
(2010) provides a survey of evidence on how shareholder voting has led to significant
changes in corporate governance and strategy.
Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) analyze
the trade off between risk sharing and monitoring: a larger block improves the incentives
for monitoring but comes at the cost of greater exposure to risk. In our model too,
the entrepreneur may need to hold a larger block to commit to monitoring and this
comes at the risk of greater exposure to firm risk. However, the focus of our paper is
on how conflicts of interests between a large (monitoring) blockholder and dispersed
shareholders lead to the emergence of additional smaller blockholders.
An additional prediction from our model is that ownership structure affects under-
pricing in IPOs. In an equilibrium where blockholders are present, share prices are
lower than the willingness to pay by well diversified liquidity shareholders. Hence IPO
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underpricing is correlated with multiple blocks sharing control of the firm. It does not
occur with other ownership structures. This is consistent with some empirical studies
(Brennan and Franks (1997), Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt (2004), Goergen
and Renneboog (2002) and Nagata and Rhee (2009)).5
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on voting. Typically, the models
on voting do not endogenize individual preferences, the price of votes and hence the
voting power of an agent (Dhillon, 2005). When applying voting theories to corporate
governance issues, on the other hand, the firm value (and hence share prices) and
shareholders decisions are closely related. An investor can decide how many shares to
buy and their voting decision changes depending on the block he chooses to buy. The
price, being set by the initial owner, becomes an endogenous variable that affects and
is affected by the existence of a second blockholder and the voting outcome.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3 provides
sufficient conditions for different ownership structures to be equilibria. In section 4 we
derive the empirical implications of the model. Finally, section 5 concludes. All the
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
An initial owner of a firm seeks to raise a minimum amount of capital K through equity
finance for the firm.6 He is endowed with 1 unit of wealth which he allocates between
the firm (a fraction wE) and a risk free asset. Potential investors are similarly endowed
with 1 unit of wealth of which they invest a fraction wi in the firm. In return for their
investment they receive shares αi = wiK−wE (1− αE) each, where αE denotes the shares
retained by the initial owner. The set of (potential) outside investors is partitioned into
two types of investors; a fraction λ are active shareholders and the remaining who are
5Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) show that IPO underpricing can
serve to ensure the participation of large investors who can monitor and hence be value enhancing.
However, in these papers control considerations are absent and the role of multiple large investors is
not analyzed. Empirically this implies that there is no difference between one or multiple blockholders.
6Initially we assume the initial owner raises just K; later in section 3.2 we show that this assumption
is without loss of generality as the initial owner always prefers to raise the minimum amount of capital.
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passive. Active shareholders are assumed to vote anticipating that their vote is going to
have an impact on the decisions of the firm.7 Passive shareholders act competitively and
take the firm’s decisions as given, ignoring their own potential influence: for technical
simplicity we assume they do not vote. The parameter λ allows us to capture the effects
of minority protection on firm ownership structures: the higher is λ the higher is the
participation of active minority shareholders.
0
Initial owner
tenders the shares
and sets αE and wE
1
Shares are issued
Investors chooses αi
2
Voting on X
3
Initial owner
chooses m
4
Final payoff
Figure 1: The Time Structure
Figure 1 shows the timeline of the game: in period 0, the initial owner decides
wE and the fraction of the shares to retain, αE . This is equivalent to announcing the
fraction of shares retained together with the share price, K−wE1−αE . In period 1, investor i
decides the fraction of shares of the firm to buy, αi. There are sufficiently many investors
in the market so that there is never a problem of excess supply of shares. If there is
under-subscription, then the project cannot go ahead. If there is oversubscription, we
assume that this is a stable situation only when no investor who gets shares is willing to
sell them at a price lower than the maximum price that an excluded investor is willing
to pay.8
In period 2, shareholders have to take a decision by voting. At this stage, the
ownership structure is common knowledge. The voting decision is about the risk profile
of the firm. For example, we may think of this as a decision about the projects that a firm
7Institutional investors such as hedge funds can be interpreted as active investors. It is well known
that the value creation effect of hedge funds is highly significant both in the short and in the long run.
For more evidence on the role of active investors see Smith (1996), Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas
(2008) and Becht, Franks, Mayer, and Rossi (2009).
8We do not explicitly model the secondary market in shares but we capture some of the spirit of the
secondary market by imposing this particular refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept.
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will invest in or the CEO’s nomination. The project values are affected by a variable X
as follows: it is normally distributed with mean R¯X+f(m) and and standard deviation
σX, where f(m) is the extra expected cash flow from monitoring (which is chosen
in period 3) and R¯ > 0, σ > 0 are parameters. Shareholders thus choose a project
profile X ∈ [0, X¯]: the higher is X the higher is the risk and return of the firm. To
ensure that there is an interesting conflict of interest, we assume that X¯ > R¯
γσ2
. Hence,
conflicts of interest between shareholders can be captured in a simple way through the
uni-dimensional linear efficiency frontier of possible projects. The decision X is taken
through majority voting. We show later that once the ownership structure is fixed,
preferences on X are single peaked (Lemma 1) so that the median shareholders ideal
point on [0, X¯] is the Condorcet Winner.9 Voting is costless. However, since only a
subset of investors are assumed to vote the Condorcet winner must be chosen from
among the ideal points Xj of the voting subset only.
In period 3 the initial owner decides whether to take a value enhancing action,
which we refer to as monitoring. His choice variable is m ∈ {0, 1}. If the initial owner
monitors (m = 1), the expected firm value increases by f (1) = K at a monetary cost of
c(1) = m¯K, with m¯ ≤ 1. If the initial owner does not monitor, f (0) = 0 and c(0) = 0.
Finally at period 4 the payoffs are realized.
Investors and initial owner have identical preferences represented by the following
utility function:
uj = −1
γ
e−γYj (1)
where j = {i, E}, i refers to an outside investor, E refers to the initial owner, γ is the
parameter of risk aversion and Yj = g(wj) is the final wealth when a fraction wj of the
wealth is invested in the project.
The certainty equivalent representation of the utility function (1) with X fixed is:
Ui = αi
(
R¯X + f(m)
)− K − wE
1− αE αi −
γ
2
σ2X2α2i + 1 (2)
9The Condorcet winner is the project that wins against every other project in pair-wise majority
voting.
9
The first part is the expected wealth from investing in the firm, the second part is
the price paid and the third is the dis-utility from investing in a risky asset. Investor i
will maximize (2) by choice of αi, given αE ,K −wE and the beliefs on X, f(m). Since
the initial owner is the residual claimant, his exponential utility function can be written
in terms of certainty equivalent as:
UE = αE(R¯X + f(m))− γ2σ
2X2α2E + 1− wE − c(m) (3)
The initial owner chooses αE , wE in period 1 and m in period 3 to maximize (3) subject
to the constraint that he needs to raise the capital, i.e. K−wE ≤
∑
iwi, or equivalently
1 − αE ≤
∑N
i=1 αi where
∑
i αi is the sum of the total shares demanded. Furthermore
αE +
∑
i αi = 1.
The wealth invested, wj , is not bounded either for the initial owner or for the
outside investors. Hence, investors can short the shares (wi < 0). This never occurs in
equilibrium as the initial owner always lowers price to the point where investors want
to own a positive fraction of the shares. For the initial owner wE < 0 means that he
receives wealth instead of investing in the project. This can be interpreted as initial
owner’s rent for the entrepreneurial idea. Finally when wj > 1 with j ∈ {E, i} it means
that the investors borrow money (at the risk free rate) in order to invest in the firm.
Hence, for the initial owner the decision is not only on the ownership structure but also
the composition of his portfolio between (personal) debt and equity. The higher the
debt, the higher is the risk exposure but the higher the control he has.
We now derive the ideal point Xj(αj) shown in Figure 2, for an investor j. We then
determine the payoff functions of players given the ownership structure defined as the
vector of shares owned by investors: ~α = (αE , α1, ..., αk) where k is the number of active
investors who hold shares.
Lemma 1 The preferred choice of X given αj, for any shareholder j ∈ {i, E}, denoted
Xj is uniquely defined by:
Xj = min
[
R¯
γσ2αj
, X¯
]
(4)
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The choice of X depends only on the investor’s shareholdings αj as R¯γσ2αj is a one-to
one function of αj . We define α¯ ≡ R¯γσ2X¯ as the fraction of shares α¯ such thatXj(α¯) = X¯.
It follows from Lemma 1 above that once ~α is fixed, preferences of investors and the
initial owner on X are single peaked. Hence, by the median voter theorem (Black
(1948)), there exists a Condorcet Winner on the set [0, X¯] and it coincides with the
preferred point of the median shareholder. Denote Xmed(~α) as the median X when
the ownership structure is ~α. To save on notation, we suppress the argument ~α. For
convenience we denote the median shareholdings as αmed.10
In the first best situation, i.e. no monitoring issues, both the initial owner and the
investors would like to have as few shares as possible and choose maximum return (i.e.
X¯), even though it comes with high risk (Lemma 2). However, the incentive prob-
lems associated with monitoring imply that the initial owner faces a trade off between
increasing the value of the firm through monitoring and his portfolio diversification.11
Notice from equations (2)-(4) that αE determines both the price paid, K−wE1−αE , and
(potentially) Xmed through the share ownership structure. Hence the indirect utility
function for active investors depends on αE , as well as the anticipated m and ~α (given
αE and K−wE). Passive investors’ indirect utility depends also on αE , but X is taken
as given. Pure strategies of the owner are 3-tuples (wE , αE ,m(αE , Xmed)) together with
a function from αE to a voting decision over X. Pure strategies of investors are functions
from (αE ,K −wE) to a shareholding αi and a voting decision over X.12 This describes
an extensive form game, where the set of players are the initial owner and other active
investors, the pure strategies and payoffs are as above. We look for subgame perfect
equilibria of the game described in Fig. 1. See the appendix for a formal definition of
equilibrium.
10Consider the frequency distribution of shares of initial owner and active investors only on the set
X. The median X is the unique Xj such that exactly half the shares are on either side of it. Since it
is common knowledge that passive investors never vote, αmed is defined only on the basis of shares of
initial owner and active investors.
11We use the term ‘diversify’ loosely to capture the notion that an agent may benefit from reducing
his exposure to the project risk.
12Since there is pairwise voting, voting is assumed to be sincere and we rule out strategic agenda
setting issues.
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3 Equilibria
We solve the game by backward induction. The last stage is the monitoring decision.
The initial owner can commit to monitoring only when he owns enough shares, αE ≥ m¯
(see Lemma 7 in Appendix). Observe that the decision to monitor is independent of
the voting outcome.
The second last stage is the voting game. This is trivial given the share ownership.
Each voter votes for his ideal point given his shares (Lemma 1) and the median share-
holder’s preferred point Xmed is chosen. Finally we come to what we call the ownership
subgame. In this subgame, investors buy their shares given (αE , wE), anticipating the
effects of their share ownership on the voting outcome and the monitoring decision.
Since the monitoring outcome is independent of ownership structure except through
αE , we can therefore partition the subgames at this stage into those where αE ≥ m¯ and
those where it is less. There is a continuum of such subgames. We define the Equilib-
rium Ownership Structure (EOS) as the Nash equilibrium of the subgame for each pair
(αE , wE) ∈ S ≡ [0, 1]× (−∞,+∞).
We define outside investors who buy shares as liquidity shareholders, or blockholders
depending on whether they hold an optimally diversified portfolio or not. Liquidity
shareholders’ shares are denoted by αl,j ,which represents the optimal portfolio when
the voting outcome is assumed to be Xj . Given the investors’ beliefs on Xmed = Xj
a straightforward maximization of the utility function for outside investors yields the
demand for shares by liquidity investors of (see Lemma 8 in Appendix):
αl,j =
XjR¯+ f(m)− K−wE1−αE
γX2j σ
2
(5)
The fraction of shares chosen by the liquidity investors depends on their beliefs on
the voting outcome Xj : αl,j is decreasing in Xj . In general, investors can short their
shares so Ul,j ≥ 1 even if αl,j < 0. However, the constraint on full subscription by the
initial owner implies that in equilibrium αl,j > 0.
Observe that the value function of liquidity investors, Ul,j is always bigger than
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1 since there is no restriction on αl,j : if the utility from holding the firms’ shares is
less than the risk free asset, then αl,j could be negative, i.e. investors can go short on
the shares. We show later that the constraint on full subscription by the initial owner
implies that in equilibrium αl,j > 0. In the particular case there Xj = X¯, we define α¯l
the optimal shareholding of the liquidity investors.
A blockholder is an outside investor who in equilibrium holds a suboptimal portfolio,
i.e. αi > αl,j where αi is the shareholding of blockholder i. Let UnBHj denote the
value function of a representative blockholder, who owns αi fraction of shares, in an
ownership structure which admits n blockholders and has Xmed = Xj (j being the
pivotal blockholder).
We can now define the first best choice for investor i formally as the optimal αi
assuming that in the second stage agent i acts as a dictator in the choice of X.
Lemma 2 Assume K−wE1−αE > f(m), the first best choice of the outside investors is X =
X¯ and αi = α¯l.
Definition 1 An Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS) corresponding to a pair (αE,
wE) is an equilibrium of the subgame beginning at the information set (αE, wE). In
particular the following must be satisfied in equilibrium: 1. UnBHj ≥ 1 (if there are
any blockholders in equilibrium) and Ul,j ≥ 1 (if there are any liquidity shareholders in
equilibrium). We call this the Participation Constraint, 2. Capital is raised, i.e.
∑
i =
αi ≥ 1−αE. 3. No active investor wants to unilaterally increase or decrease his shares,
given αE, wE. We call this the Incentive Constraint. 4. Passive investors maximize
their utility conditional on the anticipated X = Xmed. No investor who receives shares is
willing to sell them at a price lower than the maximum price that any excluded investor
is willing to pay.
The equilibrium concept is standard– that of Nash between active investors, and
passive investors act to maximize their utility given their beliefs on Xj , which must
be the right beliefs so Xmed = Xj . Refinement 4. is imposed because in case of
oversubscription, we would like a rationing rule that allocated shares in a “stable” way.
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In other words, we want to ensure that no excluded investor can do better by deviating
unilaterally.
The ownership structure can be of three types based on who is the median share-
holder: (A) (i) No Conflicts EOS where Xmed = XE = X¯, hence there are no conflicts
of interest; between the initial owner and shareholders (who hold a perfectly diversified
portfolio). (ii) Liquidity Shareholder EOS where active liquidity investors are in control
of the firm, Xmed = X¯. (B) An n-Blockholder EOS, where Xmed = Xj and n active
investors plus the initial owner hold a non-perfectly diversified portfolio. For simplic-
ity, we focus first on blockholder equilibria where all investors hold the same shares
α1. (C) The Initial Owner EOS, where Xmed = XE < X¯ and all outside investors are
liquidity shareholders.
Definition 2 A symmetric n-Blockholder ownership structure is one where there are
n > 0 active investors (blockholders) with shares α1 each and NA ≥ 0 active liquidity
investors with shares αl,1 such that α1 > αl,1 > 0, NAαl,1 = λ(1 − αE − nα1), and
Xmed = X1.
The participation constraint of liquidity investors, Ul,j ≥ 1, also implies that the
maximum price they are willing to pay, K−wE1−αE , is higher, the higher is the anticipated
risk/return profile of the firm, i.e. the higher is Xj .
Lemma 3 Liquidity shareholders are better off than blockholders regardless of the mon-
itoring decision.
This is true by definition: Liquidity investors hold the fraction of shares that provides
optimal diversification given the anticipated voting outcome, Xj . Any other sharehold-
ing gives lower utility.
The next lemma shows that if the share price is sufficiently high, the pivotal investor
holds more shares than the liquidity investors.13
13If, to the contrary, the share price is too low, so that f(m) ≥ K−wE
1−αE , investors will demand all
the shares tendered. We show later that this cannot be an equilibrium as the initial owner will always
maximize the share price.
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Lemma 4 Assume K−wE1−αE > f(m), then αl,j ≤ αj .
We now identify how many shares an investor buys when she decides to hold a block.
Lemma 5 Assume full subscription of shares. If an n-Blockholder EOS exists with
αE > 0 and K−wE1−αE > f(m), each blockholder holds
α1 =
αE (1 + λ)− λ
(1− λ)n (6)
To illustrate the intuition behind this lemma, consider a situation where the initial
owner retains αE = 30% of the shares, and liquidity investors are anticipated to buy
50%. Say that λ = 15 , this means that 10%of the liquidity investors are active. Clearly,
given that only 10% of the liquidity investors vote, at least 20% of the remaining shares
must be held by blockholders in order to have Xmed = X1 rather than XE . Suppose n =
5 this means that each blockholder must own 4% of the shares in a symmetric situation.
The essence of Lemma 5 is that under the stated conditions, no blockholder wants to
own more than the minimal fraction of shares needed to guarantee that Xmed = X1 as
that would expose them to higher risk without gaining anything in terms of control. If
they hold any less, they do not affect the voting outcome.
From Lemmas 4 and 5, it follows that blockholders, if they arise, are pivotal and hold
more shares than liquidity shareholders, but less than the initial owner, αl,j < αj < αE .
The intuition behind this uses Lemma 2: the underlying ex-ante preferences of outside
investors are such that they would prefer to move the anticipated voting decision closer
to their ex-ante ideal point X¯. However, as soon as they buy the shares, their ex-post
preferences change (Lemma 1). Now, the whole purpose of buying more shares was to
move the decision away from XE towards X¯: if they buy more shares than αE they
end up with a decision that is worse for them (ex-ante) than XE ! Hence, X1 will lie
between the preferred choice of the liquidity shareholders and the initial owner. This
is the sense in which blockholders mitigate the conflicts of interest between the initial
owner and the liquidity shareholders.
Finally, we solve the first stage maximization for the initial owner given what he
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anticipates will happen for each (αE , wE). This depends on the EOS that is anticipated
for each pair (αE , wE). These will be used in the derivations of the subgame perfect
equilibria: the method of proof is to solve for the Initial Owner’s maximization problem,
assuming a common belief about the EOS following every information set (αE , wE).
Since the analysis of the EOS is quite technical with limited economic insight, it is done
in the Appendix (Lemmas 9- 11 and Corollaries 3-4).
Before moving onto describing the subgame perfect equilibria we need some addi-
tional notation. In order to get full subscription, the initial owner must invest enough of
his own wealth in the firm to satisfy the participation constraint of the outside investors
(full subscription implies that the shares demanded must be strictly positive). Recall
that liquidity shares demanded depend on the particular X anticipated. The following
equations indicate the minimum wE to guarantee that the demand for shares for the
different ownership structures: wkE with k = {E,n, LS} is the minimum wE in case
of respectively Initial Owner Ownership Structure, n Blockholders one and Liquidity
Shareholders one. This last one is equivalent also to the No conflicts one.
wEE(αE) ≡ K −
(
R¯2
γσ2αE
+ f(m)
)
(1− αE) + E (7)
wnE(αE) ≡ K −
(
R¯X1 + f(m)− γ2X
2
1σ
2α1
)
(1− αE) (8)
wLSE (αE) ≡ K −
(
R¯X¯ + f(m)
)
(1− αE) + LS (9)
Defining η > 0 is the fraction of shares corresponding to one share, j = γX2j σ
2η the
extra capital the initial owner needs to invest to guarantee that the investors buy one
share (relative to the 0 condition).XX
We also need a participation constraint for the initial owner: he can always choose
not to monitor the manager, and either not raise any capital or simply sell the firm.
Suppose the initial owner decides not to monitor in the last stage (i.e. αE < m¯).
Proposition 1 shows that then he always chooses αE = 0 and the unique ownership
structure that emerges is a Liquidity Shareholder Equilibrium Ownership Structure:
the initial owner either does not raise capital or sells the firm letting the liquidity
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shareholders be in control of a non-monitored firm.
Proposition 1 Suppose m = 0 in period 3, in period 0 the initial owner sells the firm
when the firm has a positive NPV setting (wE = wLSE ), otherwise he does not raise the
capital and invests in the risk free asset (wE = 0). In both cases, αE = 0 < m¯. His
value function is given by:
V NME = max(R¯X¯ −K + 1, 1) (10)
When the firm is sold, the unique EOS is a Liquidity Shareholder one with X = X¯.
where wLSE is the minimum wealth that the initial owner must pledge to get full sub-
scription. This proposition illustrates the trade-offs faced by the initial owner. Since he
acts as a monopolist in the pricing of shares, when he has no constraint on his share-
holdings from monitoring, he can extract the full value of the firm without incurring
any risk, by simply selling the firm (i.e. αE = 0, wE < 0). However, investors are
willing to buy shares only if the expected NPV is positive. Otherwise he prefers not to
raise capital (wE = αE = 0) .
Proposition 1 shows that the choice of αE > 0, m = 0 by the initial owner is
dominated by the choice of either selling the firm or not raising capital. Hence, in
what follows it is sufficient to show that the participation constraint and the non-selling
constraints are satisfied, to ensure that the initial owner prefers to hold a block and take
the value enhancing action (αE ≥ m¯, m = 1) to any non-value enhancing monitoring
equilibrium.
3.1 Monitoring Equilibria
As discussed above the equilibrium ownership structure is of three types: in section
3.1.1 we analyze the first type of diversified ownership structure: this is the case where
monitoring costs are so low (m¯ ≤ α¯) that the final choice is Xmed = XE = X¯. Since this
is the first best point for outside investors (Lemma 2), there is no conflict of interest
and no incentive to hold blocks. This is the benchmark case A(i) in that it gives
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the first best outcome for all investors. We discuss the case of multiple blockholders
(case B) in Section 3.1.2, and ownership structures with one large block and a fringe
of small shareholders (case C) is discussed in Section (3.1.3). Finally case A(ii) is
the other possibility when there is a dispersed ownership structure, but in this case
Xmed = X¯ > XE . This is discussed in Section 3.1.4.
Before moving to the equilibria we show that investors are willing to receive less
shares than what they proportionally contribute. Conditional on monitoring, investing
in the firm increases the utility of the investors because it widens the possible portfolios
they can choose among. Since the initial owner is a monopolist he can push share prices
up to the point where the investors’ participation constraint is satisfied with equality.
Put another way, the initial owner contributes to capital proportionally less than what
he receives in cash flow rights: αE > wEK when m = 1. This is shown in the next
Lemma:
Lemma 6 Assume that m = 1. In any subgame perfect equilibrium, K−wE1−αE > K.
In all monitoring equilibria, the initial owner sets the price per share as high as
possible to avoid dilution of his shareholdings. If the initial owner monitors, the expected
firm value is above the return on the risk-free asset. Hence, the minimum possible price
that guarantees the participation of the investors is above the price of the risk-free asset.
3.1.1 A(i): No Conflicts Equilibrium
Proposition 2 Suppose
m¯ ∈ (0,min [α¯, m¯RCNC(K), m¯SNC(K)]] (11)
then there exists a No Conflicts (NC) equilibrium where the initial owner monitors,
m = 1, αE = m¯, Xmed = XE = X¯ and wE = wLSE (K).
(The exact values of m¯RCNC and m¯
S
NC as functions of the parameters are given in the
proof in the Appendix.)
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In this equilibrium, m¯ is so low (m¯ ≤ α¯) that the Initial Owner’s first best is the
same as other investors (XE = X¯). The initial owner retains just enough shares to
have the incentive to monitor, i.e. αE = m¯. A higher αE implies more risk exposure
without any gain in terms of monitoring. Since Xmed = X¯ there is no incentive for
any investor to hold a block. However observe that the initial owner’s shareholdings
are determined by the monitoring costs, m¯, and depending on the monitoring costs, the
initial owner can hold more or less than the liquidity shareholders. This equilibrium
ownership structure shows a benchmark situation when all shareholders interests are
aligned so conflict of interests are absent in this case.
Liquidity shareholders are willing to buy shares only if the returns are high enough
to compensate for the risk, wE ≥ wLSE , otherwise they are better off just investing
all their wealth in the risk-free asset. The initial owner then sets the highest price to
extract all the rents: wE = wLSE .
The monitoring requirement sets a maximum threshold on the shares that can be
distributed to the liquidity shareholders. Given this threshold there is a maximum
fraction of wealth that liquidity shareholders are willing to invest. The rest of the
capital (if needed) must be pledged by the initial owner (wE = wLSE ). The higher the
amount of capital the initial owner needs for the project, K, the higher the wealth he
needs to pledge, i.e. wLSE is increasing in K.
Note that given that there are no financial constraints, the initial owner could finance
the project completely on his own through borrowing money. However, he prefers to
rely on outside equity rather than issuing debt in order to limit his risk exposure. If
the value created is very high the initial owner does not need to invest any money;
indeed, he can be compensated by the investors for the monitoring exerted and the
entrepreneurial idea (wLSE < 0). These characteristics of the capital invested by the
initial owner are common to all equilibria we find.
Alternatively the initial owner could choose not to raise the capital or to sell the
firm. To be a viable project for the initial owner, the value remaining to the initial
owner after compensating the investors, must be high enough to compensate him for
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the money invested and the risk (i.e. m¯ ≤ m¯RCNC).
At the same time to be willing to remain a shareholder of the firm, rather than
sell it outright, the value created by monitoring (f(m) = K) has to be high enough.
The extra value due to monitoring compensates the initial owner for the direct cost of
monitoring as well as the indirect costs related to holding a sub-optimal portfolio. If the
extra utility created by monitoring can be achieved by a dispersed ownership structure
without monitoring then he would prefer to sell the firm (i.e. m¯ ≥ m¯SNC).
Figure 2 offers a graphic representation of the No Conflicts Equilibrium. The equi-
librium exists when the area in the graph that satisfies both the no selling and raising
capital constraints is positive. Since m¯RCNC , m¯
S
NC , α¯ > 0, we can conclude that this is the
case.
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Figure 2: No Conflicts Equilibrium (R¯ = 0.8, γ = 10, σ = 0.1, X¯ = 10).
3.1.2 B: Blockholder equilibria
The existence of blockholder equilibria depends on three necessary conditions (1) a
conflict of interest between investors and initial owner that is generated endogenously
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by the fact that they have different shares in the firm and hence different ex-ante
preferences on the risk/return profile of the firm; (2) shareholders are able to influence
the voting decision by buying more shares and (3) in equilibrium the initial owner’s
shareholding is large enough that active liquidity investors in the firm cannot jointly
ensure that Xmed = X¯. If any of these three requirements is not met, then we do not
have a blockholder equilibrium.
This section shows our main result: the existence of blockholder equilibria for inter-
mediate monitoring costs. In the following, we discuss two different cases of blockholder
equilibria. For one range of parameters, it is possible that n-Blockholder equilibria exist
(Proposition 3), but we cannot exclude other equilibria.14 However, we have a stronger
result: for some parameter values of monitoring costs, there exist only blockholder
equilibria. So, even though there are multiple equilibria in terms of the number of
blockholders, we know that there will be no non-blockholder equilibria (Corollary 1).
Proposition 3 Suppose:
m¯ ∈ (max [α¯, α˜(n, λ), m¯E1 (n, λ), m¯RC1,n (n,K), m¯S1,n(n,K)] ,
min
[
1
2
, αˆ(n, λ), m¯E2 (n, λ), m¯
RC
2,n (n,K), m¯
S
2,n(n,K)
]]
(12)
then there exists an n-Blockholder-Equilibrium where m = 1, αE = m¯, Xmed = X1 and
wE = wnE.
(The full expressions for α˜, αˆ, m¯RC1,n , m¯
RC
2,n , m¯
S
1,n, m¯
S
2,n, m¯
E
1 , m¯
E
2 are given in the Ap-
pendix)
where wnE denotes the minimum wE to guarantee that the participation constraint of
blockholders is satisfied when Xmed = X1. Proposition 3 demonstrates that there exist
blockholder equilibria where n investors prefer to hold a large block of shares (and
a sub-optimally diversified portfolio) in order to shift the decision to a higher level of
risk/return. The presence of blocks mitigates the conflicts of interests between the initial
14In Proposition 5 we show that an Initial Owner equilibrium is possible for this parameter range.
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owner and the investors (X¯ > X1 > XE). There can be multiple EOS, parametrized
by n depending on the beliefs on the EOS.
Note that the initial owner cannot prevent the entry of blockholders by setting
a different wE . If he sets a higher wE he loses rent while if he sets a lower wE (a
higher share price) drives out the participation of the blockholders. In such a case the
participation constraint of the liquidity shareholders is also not satisfied. So the initial
owner would not be able to raise capital. The condition αE < αˆ(n) guarantees that the
incentive compatibility condition to become a blockholder is satisfied: the utility of an
investor is higher when he is a blockholder with decision X1 than a liquidity shareholder
with decision XE < X1.
The reader may find it puzzling that we start with ex-ante identical outside (active)
investors, yet only some of them decide to become blockholders. This is because there
are multiple Nash equilibria for every n, and the identity of the blockholders could be
different in each of these equilibria and the rest of the investors (liquidity shareholders)
free ride on these. Like in a (discrete) public goods provision problem, the blockholders
contribute to the public good provision (i.e. moving the decision on the project closer to
the most preferred point of all outside investors) because given the other shareholders
contributions, it is a Nash equilibrium for them to contribute as long as the value of
the public good to them is sufficiently high. XX DISCUSS Allowing for collusion is not
going to change this result since all of the EOS are in the Pareto efficient setXX This
translates into the condition that αE is sufficiently low: as αE decreases, the incentives
to hold larger blocks increases. This is because, in the first place, as αE decreases, fewer
shares are needed in order to gain control over X and hence the cost of holding a block
is lower. Second, because of the convexity of Xj with respect to αj (equation (4)), it
follows that the smaller αE is, the larger is the shift in X (for the same αE − α1), i.e.
XE −X1 is greater. This implies a higher increase in the expected return of becoming
a blockholder.
Hence there exists a threshold, αˆ(n), such that when αE ≤ αˆ(n) and wE = wnE , the
utility of being a blockholder is higher than being a liquidity shareholder with the initial
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owner in control. If he decreases α1 the outcome is Xmed = XE , while if he increases
his shares he is still the median shareholder but he is moving further away from his first
best. The initial owner could get full control on the voting decision if he chose αE ≥ 12
but this comes at the expense of a higher share price and lower risk exposure. Finally,
for the liquidity shareholders, given that there are n blockholders there are no gains to
be had from increasing αi in equilibrium.
Unlike the usual public goods contribution game, however, when blockholders buy
a larger block of shares, their preferences over X are closer to those of the initial owner.
This is why the presence of blockholders mitigates, but does not remove, the conflict of
interest between the initial owner and the outside investors.
Lemma 3 implies that in the blockholder equilibrium, liquidity shareholders free
ride on blockholders as they hold the optimal portfolio. The price which satisfies the
participation constraints of the blockholders is lower than the maximum price that
liquidity shareholders are willing to pay. Therefore the existence of blockholders allows
the liquidity shareholders to extract some of the rent, that in all other equilibria goes
entirely to the initial owner. In all the other equilibria the initial owner sets the price
low enough to satisfy the participation constraint of the liquidity shareholders with
equality, and hence he extracts all the rent (see next Propositions).
To guarantee that the initial owner prefers to monitor rather than not, we have the
condition m¯ ∈ [max (m¯RC1,n (n), m¯S1,n(n)) ,min (m¯RC2,n (n), m¯S2,n(n))] (See Fig. 3). If the
monitoring costs are too high the residual value for the initial owner after compensating
the blockholder for the extra risk they bear due to the undiversified portfolio, is not
high enough to compensate for holding an undiversified portfolio and the monitoring
costs. When the monitoring costs are too low, there are blockholders with small blocks
or liquidity shareholders determining X. In such a case the risk/return outcome is very
high compared to the initial owner’s preferred point. So when the monitoring costs
are too high or too low the risk the initial owner bears is so high and the gain from
monitoring is so low that he prefers to sell the firm or not to raise capital.
Now we explain the remaining conditions that need to be satisfied to have an n-
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Figure 3: 1 Blockholder equilibrium (R¯ = 1, γ = 12, σ = 0.2, X¯ = 50, λ = 0.1). α¯ and
m¯E2 are not binding.
Blockholder Equilibrium (expression 12). First note that the initial owner can always
choose to set an αE ≥ 12 ≥ m¯ to get full control and hence it is not obvious that an n-
Blockholder Equilibrium exists. The trade off the initial owner faces is between setting
a high share price and retaining control. When m¯ ∈ [m¯E1,n, m¯E2,n], the initial owner
prefers to be in a n-Blockholder Equilibrium. There is a lower bound, αE < m¯E1,n, then
the cost to the initial owner from relinquishing control and ending up with an X that is
very far from XE , is too high. If αE > m¯E2,n, then the cost of getting control is low. In
such cases there does not exist an n−Blockholder equilibrium - there is only an Initial
Owner equilibrium (see Corollary 2). Any αE lower than 12 does not guarantee control,
so the equilibrium αE is superior, given the beliefs on EOS off the equilibrium path.
If m¯ < α¯ there are no conflicts (see Proposition 2). Alternatively when m¯ ≤ α˜(n),
outside investors can affect the vote outcome even without holding blocks, each active
investor is pivotal, even while holding liquidity stocks and Xmed = X¯ (see Proposition
6 for a formal analysis of the case).
A possible objection to our main result is that there are multiple equilibria for
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this configuration of monitoring costs. Corollary 1 shows that for some values of the
monitoring costs only n Blockholder equilibria are possible.
Corollary 1 Suppose:
m¯ ∈ ( max [α¯, α˜(1, λ), m¯E1 (1, λ), m¯RC1 (1)(K), m¯S1 (1,K)] ,
min
[
1
2
, αˆ(1, λ), m¯E2 (1, λ), m¯
RC
2 (1,K), m¯
S
2 (1,K)
] ]
(13)
then there exist n Blockholder equilibria with m = 1, αE = m¯, Xmed = X1 < X¯,
wE = w1E. No other types of equilibria with positive trade exist for these parameter
values.
This corollary is a special case of Proposition 3. The intuition behind this result is
that when monitoring costs are low enough, the cost of losing diversification for a single
blockholder to deviate and demand a block is low enough (equilibrium αE is lower than
αˆ(1, λ)). Hence, because she needs a smaller block to both win the vote (using the
vote of the active liquidity investors) and to have a large shift in X, an Initial Owner
equilibrium is ruled out. Among the possible n-Blockholder equilibria we might want to
consider the one which is most preferred by the initial owner. Of course, in our model
the equilibrium depends on the anticipated EOS and this need not be the one that the
initial owner most prefers. However, the initial owner can choose prices to rule out
equilibria with n < n∗.
Proposition 4 The optimal number of blockholders for the initial owner is:
n∗ =
[
(1 + m¯)(m¯− λ+ m¯λ)
2m¯2(1− λ)
]
> 0 (14)
Moreover
∂n∗
∂m¯
= − m¯− 2λ
2m¯3(1− λ) (15)
and
∂n∗
∂λ
= −1− m¯− 2m¯
2
2m¯2(1− λ)2 (16)
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The optimal number of blockholders for the initial owner is a trade-off between the
benefits from having few blockholders and a vote outcome closer to his optimal outcome
or having many blockholders and being able to sell the shares at a high price, i.e. low wE .
When the monitoring costs are high (m¯ ≥ 2λ) a further increase of the monitoring costs
would induce the initial owner to prefer less blockholders. In such a case blockholders
are already holding a highly undiversified portfolio and the initial owner needs to set
a very low price in order to induce them to buy the shares. Decreasing the number of
blockholders further does not reduce the share price by much but it decreases the costs
of holding a suboptimal portfolio.
On the other hand, when the monitoring costs are low, i.e. m¯ < 2λ, an increase in
the monitoring costs induces the initial owner to prefer more blockholders. In this case
the discrepancy between the preferences of the blockholders and the initial owner is not
that high so that increasing the number of blockholders allows the initial owner to raise
the price at which the shares are tendered.
Finally, the effect of the proportion of active investors among the liquidity share-
holders, λ, has a negative effect on the optimal number of blockholders preferred by the
initial owner. ∂n
∗
∂λ is negative for m¯ ≤ 12 . When more liquidity investors vote, it be-
comes cheaper for blockholders to hold sufficiently large blocks so that they are jointly
pivotal in the voting. In this sense, stronger investor protection (proxied by higher λ)
is complementary to shared control ownership structures. However, this is very costly
for the initial owner in terms of risk exposure: when λ is higher the initial owner would
prefer to set a lower price to have the vote outcome closer to his preferred point through
the expected equilibrium ownership structure. Hence the higher the participation of the
liquidity shareholders to the vote, the lower the number of blockholders the initial owner
would like to have. The overall effect is ambiguous.
3.1.3 C: Initial Owner Equilibrium
This equilibrium exists in 3 cases. First, when the monitoring costs are so high that
the initial owner has to hold more than 50% of the shares and hence no outside investor
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can influence the decision. The second case occurs when the initial owner holds less
than 50% but the equilibrium αE (i.e. m¯) is high enough such that 1 blockholder would
not have a unilateral incentive to deviate from holding liquidity shares. The third case
occurs when the Initial Owner chooses to hold more shares than what the monitoring
threshold requires in order to avoid the loss of full control. In the first and third cases
the Initial Owner equilibrium is unique. Case 1 and 2 is analyzed in Proposition 5, case
3 in Corollary 2.
Proposition 5 Suppose that
m¯ ∈
(
max
[
α¯,min
[
1
2
,max [αˆ(1, λ), αˇ(1, λ)]
]]
,min
[
m¯RCE (K), m¯
S
E(K), 1
]]
(17)
then there exists an Initial Owner equilibrium where the initial owner is the only block-
holder, m = 1, αE = m¯, Xmed = XE = R¯γσ2m¯ and wE = w
E
E.
When m¯ ∈ (max [α¯, 12] ,min [m¯RCE , m¯SE , 1]] the Initial Owner equilibrium is unique.
(The exact values of αˆ(1, λ), αˇ(1, λ), m¯RCE and m¯
S
E as functions of the parameters are
given in the appendix.)
where wEE denotes the minimum wE to guarantee that the demand for shares is at least
1 share when the outcome is XE .
Consider first the case, when the monitoring costs are very high (m¯ ≥ 12), such that
the initial owner is willing to monitor only if he holds more than 50% of the shares. This
implies that he is highly exposed to firm risk and because he is in control of the vote
outcome he chooses a low risk/return project. As usual, the participation constraint of
the initial owner requires m¯ ≤ min[m¯RCE , m¯SE ] (Figure 4).
A less obvious result is that an Initial Owner equilibrium also exists if the monitoring
costs are smaller than 12 , although in this case it is not unique. As we saw in such a
case there may be blockholder equilibria as well, but we cannot rule out an Initial
Owner equilibrium. An Initial Owner equilibrium can exist when m¯ < 12 , when no
single investor has a unilateral incentive to deviate to become a blockholder.Condition
m¯ > αˆ(1, λ) ensures that then an investor is not willing to unilaterally hold more shares
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Figure 4: Initial Owner Equilibrium (R¯ = 2, γ = 12, σ = 0.2, X¯ = 10, λ = 0.05).
in order to influence the voting decision, given wE = wEE . The condition m¯ > αˇ(1, λ)
ensures that no excluded outside (active) investor is willing to buy shares from an
included passive investor at a higher price than the equilibrium price. Finally, in order
to guarantee conflicts of interests between investors and initial owner, we set m¯ > α¯.
As in the previous cases the participation constraint of the liquidity shareholders has
to be satisfied and hence wE = wEE .
We now analyze the case where an Initial Owner equilibrium arises because the initial
owner chooses to retain full control (αE = 12 + ηE) in order to avoid an n-Blockholder
equilibrium.
Corollary 2 Suppose
m¯ ∈ (max [α¯, α˜(n, λ), ] ,min [m¯RCE (K), m¯SE(K)]) (18)
and either m¯ ≤ m¯E1,n(n, λ), or m¯ > m¯E2,n(n, λ) then an Initial Owner Equilibrium exists
and is unique where m = 1, αE = 12 + ηE, Xmed = XE and wE = w
E
E.
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The initial owner is willing to hold αE > 12 > m¯ when the monitoring costs are either
very high, m¯ > m¯E2,n or very low m¯ < m¯
E
1,n. The intuition behind this result is that
when the monitoring costs are very high, m¯ > m¯E2,n, the cost of increasing αE a little
bit and reducing diversification is very small relative to the gain from controlling the
vote outcome and choosing his preferred risk/return combination. When the monitoring
costs are low, on the other hand, the initial owner does not hold many shares and so
blockholders have a low cost from owning blocks. Hence, the initial owner faces a large
cost arising from the conflict of interests on the risk/return vote outcome. For this
reason he prefers to increase αE to a point where he can control the vote outcome,
αE >
1
2 . The other conditions have the same rationale as previous Propositions so we
do not repeat them here.
3.1.4 A(ii): Liquidity Shareholders equilibrium
We now consider the second type of equilibria with a dispersed ownership structure.
Intuitively this happens when there are sufficiently many active liquidity shareholders
and m¯ is not too high, so that the first bestX can be achieved even without blockholders.
Proposition 6 Suppose
m¯ ∈
(
α¯,min
[
1
2
, α˜(n, λ), m¯NC1 (K), m¯
NC
2 (K)
]]
(19)
then there exists a Liquidity Shareholders equilibrium with n (in addition to the fraction
λ) active investors where m = 1, αE = m¯, Xmed = X¯ and wE = wLSE (K).
(The exact values of mNC1 (K), m¯
NC
2 (K) as functions of the parameters are given in the
proof in the appendix.)
A Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium exists when the monitoring costs are relatively
low, but not low enough that there are no conflicts (i.e. m¯ > α¯). In this equilibrium, the
initial owner finds it optimal to choose αE = m¯, but m¯ is sufficiently small so that there
are enough active liquidity shareholders to be pivotal. In particular we can have two
cases: one where the fraction λ of the liquidity shareholders is sufficient to change the
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Figure 5: Liquidity Shareholder Equilibrium (R¯ = 2, γ = 12, σ = 0.2, X¯ = 10,
λ = 0.05).
vote outcome (i.e. n = 0) and the other where there are n active investors in addition
to the fraction λ active liquidity investors who vote and ensure that the outcome is X¯.
If monitoring costs are higher (m¯ > α˜(n, λ)), then there is an n blockholder EOS and
if m¯ > 12 then there is an Initial Owner EOS. Finally, as in the case of the No Conflicts
and the Initial Owner equilibrium, when the monitoring costs are higher m¯NC1 than the
initial owner prefers to raise no capital and if monitoring costs are higher than m¯NC2 ,
he prefers to sell the firm.
Again, the participation constraint of liquidity shareholders is satisfied, at wE =
wLSE (K).
Note that the initial owner could always choose to retain a strictly higher fraction of
shares (αE > m¯) to induce a blockholder EOS or even to hold αE bigger than half, to
induce an Initial Owner EOS. In either of these cases, the vote outcome is closer to his
own preferred point. However the higher control comes at the expense of both a lower
price paid by the investors, more dilution and a less diversified portfolio for the initial
owner.
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3.2 Optimal amount of capital raised
In this section we relax the assumption that the initial owner raises just enough capital
needed to implement the project, K. We allow the initial owner to invest more capital
I ≥ K and use the difference, I − K to buy the risk free asset. This would offer
him the possibility to achieve the preferred degree of diversification through the firm’s
investment in the risk free asset: hence the conflict of interest between the initial owner
and outside investors may disappear. We show in the proposition below that our results
are robust to relaxing this assumption.
Proposition 7 The initial owner always strictly prefers to raise the minimum amount
of capital, i.e. I = K.
Observe that the initial owner acts as a monopolist when setting the share price.
Hence, if he increases I, this lowers the price per share in equilibrium and it lowers the
risk of the project for the same X. The decrease in price decreases the initial owner’s
utility in such a way that it more than offsets the increase in utility due to a lower risk
of the project. This conclusion follows because a higher amount raised implies a lower
utility for outside investors since they get profits lower than their contribution (Lemma
6). Moreover equilibrium X does not change. To satisfy the participation constraint
therefore the initial owner must increase his own participation for the same αE .
4 Comparative Statics and Empirical Implications
In what follows we look more in depth the the important predictions of our model and
discuss how they relate to the empirical literature on ownership structure (See Lemmas
16 –19 in the Appendix for formal results supporting our claims in this section.).
4.1 What does Ownership Structure depend on?
We interpret higher λ as higher participation by small investors in voting decisions,
which could be due to higher legal protection to small shareholders or voting institutions
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that encourage participation in shareholder meetings.15
Suppose we start out in an n blockholder equilibrium with number of blockholders
sufficiently small (n ≤ 12η ) and monitoring costs sufficiently small (m¯ < 12). The effect
of higher λ in our model is ambiguous: on the one hand when λ increases, αˆ(n, λ) also
increases which means that it becomes less costly to hold blocks relative to the benefits.
On the other hand when λ increases, α˜(n, λ) increases: outside investors may be able
to shift the decision on X without holding blocks and hence it is easier to obtain a
liquidity shareholders equilibrium. In both cases, the size of the median block decreases
and hence more risky projects are chosen, making it worse for the initial owner when
price is fixed. The initial owner may respond by changing the price. Hence, if the
starting point is a blockholder equilibrium and m¯ is close to 12 the initial owner may
switch to holding majority control (see point (d) Lemma 16 in the Appendix). This
higher concentration implies a lower risk outcome for the firm. If the starting point is a
blockholder equilibrium and m¯ is sufficiently far from 12 , then there may be no change
in the ownership structure in response to a change in λ.
In contrast, if we start out in an Initial Owner equilibrium (high m¯), the increase
in λ may have no effect on the ownership structure or on the size of the median share.
Similarly, starting out in a No Conflicts equilibrium or in a Liquidity Shareholders
equilibrium, the ownership structure does not change.
Our predictions for the effect of higher minority participation via say shareholder
protection laws depends on the nature of the industry. Industries characterized by a
high or very low degree of agency problems are less likely to respond with a more dis-
persed ownership structure, while industries with intermediate levels of agency problems
should switch to more dispersed ownership structure when facing an increase in minority
participation.
As Becht, Bolton and Roell (2002) conclude in their overview of corporate gover-
nance, there is a trade off between small investor protection and monitoring of man-
15For example until a few years ago in Germany only shareholders with more than 5% participation
could vote. Alternatively, shareholders’ vote participation can be related to information disclosure and
hence the ability to make informed decisions.
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agerial discretion. Our results are consistent with this view: higher λ may lead to
decisions closer to small shareholder’s preferred points without compromising on mon-
itoring only when monitoring is not very costly in a firm. When monitoring is costly,
in our model shareholder protection reduces the willingness of the initial owner to raise
capital, or to monitor. So, excessive minority protection can be detrimental for firm
value. Counter-intuitively, the higher is λ, the higher may be the initial owner’s incen-
tives not to participate or to keep control of the voting decision.
Second, X¯ captures the potential for conflict in a firm. For example, high risk and
high return firms are likely to be more innovative industries while mature sectors would
be likely to have a low X¯. In our model, as X¯ increases, α¯ decreases so that the proba-
bility of observing a dispersed ownership structure with no conflicts is lower. Increasing
the conflict of interest in general reduces the willingness of the initial owner to monitor
or even to raise capital (∂V
NM
E
∂X¯
≥ 0). Assuming that the participation constraints of
the initial owner are satisfied, the range of m¯ such that an n blockholder equilibrium
exists becomes smaller ( ∂αˆ
∂X¯
≥ 0) Ceteris paribus, in more mature sectors having a
choice only of low risk/low return projects (low X¯), ownership structures with multiple
blockholders are less likely to be observed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in more
mature sectors it is more common to see families in control of firms. In very innovative
industries (high X¯) , on the other hand, we should observe multiple blockholder owner-
ship structures. These blockholders are usually represented by institutional investors,
e.g. venture capitalists, who professionally look for firms with a high risk/return profile.
Ceteris paribus, the higher the potential for conflict in a firm the more likely are multiple
blockholder ownership structures.
The results of Carlin and Mayer (2000) note a positive relationship between the
size of the largest blockholder and the second and third blockholders. The size of the
second blockholder is positively related to the size of the largest blockholder. Our model
provides a nice explanation of this phenomenon: when the initial large shareholder has a
bigger stake, the size of other blocks must be sufficiently big to counterbalance the voting
power of the first. Moreover, Carlin and Mayer (2000) find that when a third blockholder
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is present, the size of the second is much smaller and similar to the third one: our core
mechanism suggests that this is because when there are more blockholders, each one can
be smaller as long as they counterbalance the initial large shareholder. An interesting
prediction of our theory is that regardless of the number and size of blockholders (even
in asymmetric equilibria), there is going to be a size difference between the largest block
and the second largest block.
Third, consider the effect of m¯ on the possible equilibria. One interpretation of
high m¯ is the degree of agency problems. The higher is the degree of agency problems,
the higher is the monitoring required from the initial owner. Empirically, one can
distinguish firms on the basis of measures of information asymmetry based on a firms
growth opportunities, the market microstructure of the firms stock and analyst forecasts
of a firm’s earnings per share (Clark and Shastri (2000)). High monitoring costs are more
common in firms dedicated to innovation or R&D where moral hazard issues are much
more pervasive. The higher are the agency problems, the higher is the participation
of the largest blockholder (through higher monitoring costs). This implies that in a
blockholder equilibrium, if the number of blockholders is fixed, each of them would hold
a higher stake. Hence, according to our model, the higher is m¯ the higher is the stake
of the largest blockholder. In firms with very high measures of information asymmetry
we should see more concentrated ownership and less risky project choices.
A higher voting threshold on the other hand increases the cost of full control to the
owner, so countries with higher voting thresholds should have less concentrated ownership
structures according to our theory.
When the project size K increases the initial owner has to contribute the extra
amount needed to finance the project. Thus, the share price does not change when
more capital is needed. However because the relative value added by the monitoring
decreases, it becomes more attractive for the initial owner to sell the idea and have
a totally dispersed ownership structure or not raise capital at all (see Lemma 19 in
the Appendix). This can best be understood in Figure 3: when K increases the area
showing the various equilibria shrinks.
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Finally, we should mention that one of the significant patterns that emerges from
empirical studies is how hedge funds are much more activist and lead to higher returns
for firms than pension funds (Yermack (2010)): this is partly explained by the greater
freedom that hedge funds have to choose their stakes strategically relative to pension
funds. In our theory, this difference is not analyzed.
4.2 The implications of the Ownership Structure
Let us now look at the predictions we make on how ownership structure influences firm
choices. In our model, the risk/return decision depends on the size of the median share-
holder (we assume a 50% majority threshold, but the generalization to any threshold is
the pivotal voter). Ceteris paribus, the smaller the size of the median block the higher is
the predicted firm value and firm risk. Of course, in our model, the smaller the median
block, the more diversified is the shareholder. The general prediction is that it is the
level of diversification of the median shareholder that affects the value and risk profile
of a firm, and the median shareholder need not be the largest shareholder.
To the best of our knowledge there is no detailed study of ownership structure and
firm risk. However, we can find some indirect evidence of our mechanism. Carlin and
Mayer (2003) and John (2008) find a correlation between firm risk and ownership struc-
tures. In the first paper, blockholders are present in high risk firms, while a single
blockholder is common in low risk firms, while in the second there is a negative rela-
tionship between concentration and risk. Laeven and Levine (2008b) focus on banks
ownership structure and show that risk taking behavior of banks does depend on own-
ership structure: banks with at least one blockholder are more conservative than firms
with dispersed ownership. Our results, while broadly consistent with these findings,
suggest that the story is more nuanced as we can distinguish on the basis of the size
of the median block. Moreover our model shows how primitives like the potential for
conflict over risk drive the ownership structure: the causation therefore runs both ways.
Our predictions on how ownership structure affects firm value are consistent with
the empirical literature which shows that the effect of blockholders on the value of
35
the firm is usually positive (Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Kirchmaier and Grant
(2005)). Most studies find too that a second blockholder or third blockholder increases
firm value. This evidence holds across countries and across publicly listed or private
firms.Lehmann and Weigand (2000) find that a second large shareholder improves the
profitability of listed companies in Germany. According to Volpin (2002) in Italy, when
blockholders form syndicates the firm market value is higher than when there is a
single blockholder. In Europe and Asia, higher dividends are positively related to the
number of blockholders (Faccio, Lang, and Young, 2001). Maury and Pajuste (2005)
have shown that when there are 2 blockholders with similar interests, the existence
of a third blockholder increases firm value. In Spain the number of blockholders is
positively related to a better performance of private firms (Gutierrez and Tribo, 2004).
Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) studying French IPOs find that when the owner
is powerful, the firm is less valued; when the initial owner shares control with other
blockholders the value increases.
Our paper offers an alternative explanation for the underpricing observed in IPOs.
(see Brennan and Franks (1997), Boulton, Smart, and Zutter (forthcoming), Nagata and
Rhee (2009) and Yeh and Shu (2004)) In particular Brennan and Franks (1997) argue
that underpricing can be more severe when the initial owner wants to avoid blocks.
However, they note that this is not a stable outcome and over time blocks are formed
anyway. The findings of Brennan and Franks (1997) are in line with our predictions.
If the initial owner could choose the share allocation and retain control, he would be
willing to do so even though this implies a lower price. However, if share trade is allowed
this outcome cannot be stable. Our paper implicitly takes into account the possibilities
of re-trading. In our blockholder equilibria moreover, we find that liquidity shareholders
free ride on blockholders in that they are willing to pay a higher price for the shares
than what they actually pay (this is despite the the stability against re-trading that we
impose). In this sense we show how there can be underpricing even in this more general
setting for an IPO. Our theory predicts therefore that underpricing occurs when the size
of the initial block (initial owner) is not too large (in particular less than the relevant
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voting threshold) and not too small. In such a case the predictions of our model are
similar to those of Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006):
underpricing occurs when blockholders are present and it is higher, the higher the size
of the block.
We can differentiate between our results and those of Stoughton and Zechner (1998)
and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006). Underpricing in their model occurs to guarantee the
participation of a single large shareholder who must undertake costly monitoring and so
underpricing is associated with one large shareholder. In our model underpricing occurs
not when there is a single large shareholder but rather when there is shared control
among multiple blockholders. The larger is the differential between the size of the
blocks and the size of minority stakes, the higher is the rent that liquidity shareholders
obtain, and it is in this sense that underpricing is more severe when the differential is
bigger.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the determinants of ownership structure and its effect on the risk
profile of a firm when decisions are taken through shareholders’ vote. Agency problems
and the need for monitoring lead to a less diversified initial large shareholder. Because
of his stakes he is more conservative than outside shareholders on risk, leading to a
conflict of interests on this decision. This gives incentives for mid-sized blockholders
who mitigate the conflicts of interests between the largest blockholder and minority
investors. We use the model to explain the three different ownership structures that
can arise: one large shareholder with a fringe of minority shareholders, mutiple mid-
sized blocks and fully dispersed structures.
The model provides the framework to explain a variety of phenomena reported in
empirical studies such as the positive relationship between the presence of blockholders
and firm value, ownership concentration and risk, the role of ownership in IPO under-
pricing. An important take away message of our paper is that there is a clear distinction
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between ownership structures with one large shareholder and those with multiple in-
termediate sized blockholders, both in terms of the conditions under which they are
observed as well as in the implications for firm policy on risk.
Although our paper assumes that all outside investors are identical, the paper could
be easily extended to the case of heterogenous agents. Indeed this would help to re-
duce the problem of multiple equilibria. In this case less risk averse (or wealthier)
investors would be the natural blockholders and we would expect that if this occurs,
the risk/return choice is even more stark. The other important extensions to the pa-
per are to allow different voting mechanisms (e.g.dual class shares, cumulative voting,
agenda choic, plurality vs majority rules etc) and allowing more than one firm in the
economy.
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A Appendices
A.1 The Model
A.1.1 Lemma 1:
Proof. The proof is obvious. We just maximize the objective functions (overX) of the outside investors,
equation (2), and of the initial owner, equation (3), given the fraction of shares held, αj . Concavity
ensures uniqueness of the solution.
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A.1.2 Equilibrium definition
Our notion of equilibrium is subgame perfect equilibrium of the game described in Fig. 1. Note that
because in many potential equilibria more than one investor needs to buy shares for the initial owner
to find it worthwhile to start the firm, there is always a No Trade equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
no investor buys any shares anticipating that no other investor will buy shares. Below we provide a
definition for equilibria with positive trade.
Equilibrium is a monitoring level, m ∈ {0, 1}, a fraction α∗E of shares held by the initial owner,
a fraction of wealth invested w∗E , a decision Xmed and an allocation of shares among investors, ~α
∗
such that: (i) α∗E and w
∗
E maximize the utility of the initial owner given the anticipated demand, the
anticipated monitoring level,m, and the anticipated ownership structure ~α(K−wE , αE). (ii) Each active
investor chooses αi to maximize her utility given K − w∗E , α∗E , the anticipated m and the anticipated
shares of all other active investors denoted α−i. (iii) Each passive investor chooses αi to maximize her
utility given K − w∗E , α∗E and the anticipated m and Xmed. (iv) In equilibrium there must be full
subscription. There can be excess demand in equilibrium as long as no investor who owns shares is
willing to sell them at a price lower than the maximum willingness to pay of the excluded investors.
(v) The value enhancing decision must be optimal for the initial owner given his stake and the vote
outcome. (vi) Expectations are rational.
A.2 The equilibria.
Lemma 7 The initial owner chooses m = 1 iff αE ≥ m¯.
Proof. At date 3, the ownership structure, ~α, and thus Xmed are already fixed. Given the initial
owner’s objective function (3), he chooses m = 1 iff the utility from m = 1 is greater than from m = 0,
that is when:
αE
`
XmedR¯+K
´− γ
2
α2EX
2
medσ
2 − m¯K ≥ αEXmedR¯− γ
2
α2EX
2
medσ
2 (20)
Rearranging, we get the condition αE ≥ m¯.
Lemma 8 Let Xj be the belief on the voting outcome and K−wE the capital demanded. Then liquidity
shareholders demand αl,j as defined in equation (5).
Proof. Investor l chooses αl,j to maximize equation (2) whereXj = Xmed. The first order condition
implies equation (5). The second order condition is satisfied as long as Xj > 0, so this is a maximum.
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A.2.1 Lemma 3
Proof. As the liquidity shareholding αl,j maximizes the utility of an investor given a vote outcome,
any shareholding α1 6= αl,j gives less utility.
A.2.2 Lemma 4
Proof. Consider first the case where αj ≥ α¯. Hence by Lemma 1, Xj = R¯γσ2αj and αl,j = αj +
f(m)−K−wE1−αE
R¯2
γσ2α2
j
. By assumption, f(m)− K−wE
1−αE < 0 and thus αl,j < αj .
Now let αj < α¯. By definition, j is the median shareholder, hence Xmed = Xj = X¯. As f(m) −
K−wE
1−αE < 0 a liquidity investor always chooses α¯l < α¯ and hence it is sufficient to show that no active
investors hold αj < α¯l. Assume to the contrary investors j holds αj < α¯l. (Active) Investor j can
improve his utility by choosing α¯l and voting for X = X¯ without changing Xmed. Contradiction to
the equilibrium definition where shareholders are maximizing their utility when X is fixed. This proves
that in equilibrium αj ≥ αl,j .
A.2.3 Lemma 2:
Proof. By Lemma 1, the first best X for investor i is given Xi = min
h
R¯
γσ2αi
, X¯
i
. Plugging the function
Xi = X(αi) into equation (2), investor i’ utility function is decreasing in αi. Investors ideal point is
X = X¯ and α¯l.
A.2.4 Lemma 5:
Proof. The proof follows these steps: (A) compute the utility of the median shareholder (a) when
Xmed = X1 < X¯ and (b) when Xmed = X1 = X¯; (B) Show that (a) α−1 > 0; (b) α1 + α−1 ≥ αE > α1;
(c) αE ≥ λ(1− αE − nα1); (C) Derive equation (6).
(A.a) Since Xmed = X1 < X¯, by Definition 2, shareholder 1 is the median shareholder and α1 > α¯.
Using equation (2), the utility of the median shareholder is:
UnBH1 = 1 + α1
„
X1R¯+ f(m)− K − wE
1− αE
«
− γ
2
α21X
2
1σ
2
By Lemma 1 and the fact that Xmed = X1 < X¯, this is equivalent to
α1(f(m)− K − wE
1− αE ) + 1 +
R¯2
2γσ2
(21)
By assumption, f(m)− K−wE
1−αE < 0, hence U
nBH
1 is decreasing in α1.
(A.b) Suppose instead that Xmed = X1 = X¯. By definition α¯l < α1 in an n-Blockholder EOS and
α¯l = argmax Ui(αi)|X=X¯ . Hence, given the shape of the utility function (2), UnBH1 is decreasing in α1.
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(B.a) First note that α−1 can only be non negative as it is defined as the sum of the anticipated
shares of the active investors so those that vote. Hence it is sufficient to show that α−1 6= 0. Suppose
to the contrary that α−1 = 0 in an n-Blockholder EOS. In order to have Xmed = X1 we must have
α1 ≥ αE , since investor 1 is the only outside investor who votes. From part (a), we know that UnBH1
above is decreasing in α1 and hence investor 1 is better off setting α1 +α−i = αE , otherwise the initial
owner becomes the median shareholder. But in this case, Xmed = X1 = XE and de facto investor 1 does
not affect the vote outcome. Hence he prefers to be a liquidity shareholder and his optimal shareholding
is given by α¯l. Contradiction to the fact that this is an n-Blockholder EOS (since investor 1 wants to
deviate unilaterally). Hence, α−1 > 0 in any n-Blockholder EOS.
(B.b) αE > α1 follows from the proof of part (1) above. We need to prove that α1 + α−1 ≥ αE .
Suppose to the contrary that α1 + α−1 < αE . Then αE = αmed and so Xmed = XE . This is not an
n-Blockholder EOS by Definition 2. Contradiction.
(B.c) αE ≥ λ(1−αE−nα1). Suppose to the contrary that αE < λ(1−αE−nα1). Then it is optimal
for an investor holding α1 to deviate and hold αl,1. This contradicts the Definition 2 of a n-Blockholder
EOS.
(C) As UnBH1 is decreasing in α1 and nα1 ≥ αE − λ(1− αE − nα1). Equation (6) follows.
A.2.5 Proposition 1:
Proof. We apply backward induction. Suppose the initial owner raises capital he maximizes the
following objective function:
max
αE ,wE
U (m = 0) = R¯Xmed(αE)αE − γ
2
Xmed(αE)
2σ2α2E + 1− wE (22)
subject to the relevant participation constraint, wE ≥ wjE(αE) where wjE(αE) = {wEE , wnE , wLSE }.
Substituting for wjE in the objective function, it can be checked that U (m = 0) is decreasing in αE
for all wjE , for Xmed ≤ X¯. Therefore α∗E = 0 is the optimal choice of the initial owner for any ownership
structure.
When α∗E = 0, and there is at least one active investor (λ > 0), all active investors vote for X¯ and
hence Xmed = X¯. To satisfy the participation constraint of outside investors wE = wE∗LS and the
Liquidity Shareholder EOS is the unique EOS. Also it is trivial to see that no investor is willing to sell
his shares at a price lower than the maximum that an excluded investor is willing to pay.
The initial owner’s utility is given by R¯X¯ −K +1− LS If he invests in the riskfree asset his utility
is 1. Hence when the project has a positive NPV he sells the firm, otherwise he does not raise capital.
The initial owner’s value function is then given by equation (10).
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A.3 Monitoring Equilibria
First we provide full expressions for wEE , w
n
E , w
LS
E of the minimum wealth that the initial owner needs
to pledge to guarantee that the participation constraints are satisfied:
Let j = γX
2
j σ
2η where η > 0 is the fraction of shares corresponding to one share.
wEE(αE) ≡ K −
„
R¯2
γσ2αE
+ f(m)
«
(1− αE) + E (23)
wnE(αE) ≡ K −
“
R¯X1 + f(m)− γ
2
X21σ
2α1
”
(1− αE) (24)
wLSE (αE) ≡ K −
`
R¯X¯ + f(m)
´
(1− αE) + LS (25)
A.3.1 The EOS
In this section, we provide sufficient conditions under which various EOS exist for different pair of
(αE , wE) ∈ S ≡ [0, 1]× (−∞,∞). This is needed, since in order to show that a putative equilibrium is
subgame perfect, we must specify what happens off the equilibrium path.
First, observe that for certain combinations of (αE , wE) there always exists a no trade equilibrium
where no investors participate in the share issue. Define wNTE =
8>><>>:
wEE if αE > max
ˆ
1
2
, α¯
˜
w1E if α¯ ≤ αE ≤ 12
wLSE if αE ≤ α¯
.
This is the minimum amount the initial owner needs to invest in order to guarantee that the
participation constraint of investors is satisfied (across all X) for different levels of α. If wE < w
NT
E
then there is no trade, i.e. the project does not go ahead.
Define:
w
E
(αE) ≡ K − f(m)(1− αE) (26)
αˆ(n) ≡ max[αˆ1(n), αˆ2(n)] (27)
αˆ1(n) ≡ 2λ
2(1 + λ)− n(1− λ) (28)
αˆ2(n) ≡ 2α¯(1− λ)n+ λ−
p
λ2 + 4α¯(1− λ)n (α¯(1− λ)n− 1− 2α¯(1 + λ))
2 (1 + λ)
(29)
αˇ(n) ≡ n(1− λ)α¯+ λ
1 + λ
(30)
α˜(n) ≡ λ
1 + λ
+
nη(1− λ)
1 + λ
(31)
Suppose αE is fixed, then w
E
is the maximum wE that guarantees that f(m) ≤ K−wE1−αE . αˆ(n) is the
value of αE such that if αE ≤ αˆ(n) then wEE ≤ wnE . This may differ depending on X: In particular if
αE ≤ αˆ1(n), then wEE ≤ wnE where X1 < X¯, and if αE ≤ αˆ2(n), then wEE ≤ wnE where X1 = X¯. αˇ(n)
is the value of αE such that when αE ≤ αˇ(n), α1 = α¯. Finally α˜(n) is the value of αE such that when
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αE ≤ α˜(n) we have αE ≤ nα¯l + λ(1− αE − nα¯l) and α¯l is evaluated at wE = wLSE so that α¯l = η.
Lemma 9 There exists an Initial Owner EOS, with Xmed = XE < X¯ for any pair (αE , wE), satisfying
the following conditions:
αE ∈
„
max
„
α¯,min
»
1
2
,max [αˆ(1), αˇ(1)]
–«
, 1
–
(32)
wE ∈
»
wEE(αE),min[w
1
E(αE), w
E
(αE)
«
(33)
When m = 1, the set of αE such that conditions (32) and (33) are satisfied is non-empty.
Proof. Note that as wE ≤ w
E
, f(m) ≤ K−wE
1−αE .
From Definition 1: An Initial Owner EOS exists for any combination of (αE , wE) iff
1.
P
i αi ≥ 1 − αE and Ul,E ≥ 1. This implies that Ul,E > 1, i.e. αl,E > 0. This holds iff iff
wE ≥ wEE . This is the first part of condition (33).
2. The incentive constraint of active investors is satisfied; i.e. no liquidity investor has an incentive
to switch to becoming a blockholder and get a higher utility when the decision changes to X1
from XE . Since αE > αˆ(1), w
E
E < w
1
E . Hence condition (33) implies that Ul,E > 1 > U
1BH
1 .
3. αE > α¯ ensures that XE < X¯.
4. No shareholder is willing to sell his participation at a price lower than the price at which the
excluded investors are willing to buy. Any active investor who is excluded can do better by
buying liquidity shares α¯l from a passive investor (who does not vote) at a price slightly higher
than the initial owner’s price, if by voting he is able to become pivotal and change the outcome
to X¯. To avoid this possibility we impose the following condition:
λ(1− αE − α¯l) + α¯l < αE (34)
A sufficient condition for this is that αE > αˇ > α˜(1).
Therefore, the above condition plus condition arising in 2. αE > max[αˆ(1), αˇ(1)]. However these
conditions become irrelevant when the initial owner has the majority of the shares since then, no
active investors can change the vote outcome. This implies that αE > min
ˆ
1
2
,max[αˆ(1), α˜(1)]
˜
.
Putting together the constraints of point 3. and 4., the lower bound of (32) is given.
Lemma 10 There exists an n-Blockholder EOS, with Xmed = X1 < X¯, for any pair (αE , wE), satisfy-
ing the following conditions:
αE ∈
„
αˇ(n),min
»
αˆ1(n),
1
2
––
(35)
wE ∈ [wnE(αE), w
E
(αE)) (36)
46
Proof. Observe that X1 < X¯ iff α1 > α¯ (Lemma 1). Using Lemma 5 this condition is equivalent
to αE > αˇ(n), the lower boundary of condition (35).
An n-Blockholder EOS with X1 < X¯ exists iff the conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied:
1. The participation constraint of blockholders is satisfied iff
UnBH1 =
`
R¯X1 + f(m)
´
α1 − K − wE
1− αE α1 −
γ
2
X21σ
2α21 + 1 ≥ 1 (37)
Rearranging, this is equivalent to wE ≥ wnE(αE), the lower boundary of condition (36). By
Lemma 3, liquidity shareholders participation constraint is always satisfied whenever the block-
holders’ is, hence Ul,1 ≥ 1.
2. From Lemma 5, since wE ≤ w
E
by condition (36) his utility UnBH1 is decreasing in α1 so the
blockholder holds just enough to be pivotal. Hence, no blockholder wants to increase his shares
from α1.
Lemma 5 shows that if the blockholder decreases his shareholding, the highest possible utility a
blockholder investor can achieve, is given by being a liquidity shareholder. Hence, the incentive
compatibility constraint is UnBH1 ≥ Ul,E . Because αE ≥ αˆ1(n) we know from point 2. of the
proof of Lemma 9 that since wE ≥ wnE , UnBH1 ≥ Ul,E . This is the first upper bound in condition
(35).
Finally because an investor wants to hold a block only if he is pivotal in the vote outcome,
we need to impose that αE ≤ 12 . Suppose αE > 12 then Xmed = XE always, so there is no
Blockholder EOS. This gives the second upper bound in condition (35).
Hence, no blockholder wants to change his shares unilaterally from α1.
Finally we check that liquidity shareholders cannot gain from unilateral deviation. No (active)
liquidity shareholder has an incentive to hold shares bigger than α1 in order to changeXmed < X1,
as this would reduce their utility (which is increasing in X and decreasing in shareholdings when
αi > αl,j).
If the investors choose any αi < α1 they do not change the outcome, hence αl(X1) maximizes
their utility.
3. If an included liquidity investor sold his shares to an an excluded investor, the excluded investor
would have to buy more than the block α1 to change the outcome and get a bigger rent than in-
cluded liquidity shareholders. However blockholders do not make any rents as their participation
constraint is binding, so there is no incentive to re-trade.
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Corollary 3 There exists an n-Blockholder EOS, with Xmed = X1 = X¯, for any pair (αE , wE), satis-
fying the following conditions:
αE ∈
„
max [α¯, α˜(n)] ,min
»
αˇ(n), αˆ2(n),
1
2
––
(38)
wE ∈ [wnE(αE), w
E
(αE)) (39)
where 1 ≤ n ≤MA.
Proof.
The conditions follow from Lemma 10. However to ensure that the blockholders always hold a non
diversified portfolio such that Xmed = X¯, we impose the conditions αE > α˜(n) and αE ≤ αˇ(n). Of
course α˜n depends on wE , αE . Notice that α˜(n) < αE < αˇE(n), since α¯l < α1 < α¯.
Lemma 11 For any pair (αE , wE) there exists a Liquidity Shareholder EOS, with Xmed = X¯ with
n+ λ(1−αE−nα¯l)
α¯l
active investors holding α¯l if:
αE ∈
„
α¯,min
„
α˜(n),
1
2
«–
(40)
wE(αE) ≥ wLSE (αE) (41)
Proof.
Let Ul,α¯ denote the value function of a liquidity shareholder when X = X¯, and he holds the optimal
shareholdings. A liquidity shareholder EOS exists iff the conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied:
1. By the proof of Lemma 8, point 1. and 2. Definition 1 are satisfied iff wE ≥ wLSE (αE).
2. As long as αE ≤ α˜E(n), Xmed = X¯. No active liquidity investor wants to increase or decrease
his shareholdings since this is the most preferred point (see Lemma 2). So point 3. of Definition
1 is satisfied.
3. Passive investors hold α¯l which maximizes their utility.
4. No investor is willing to sell his shares to any excluded investors as the maximum price at which
excluded investors are willing to buy the shares is the minimum price at which the liquidity
shareholders are willing to sell since X is already at its first best for outside investors.
Corollary 4 There exists a No Conflicts EOS, with Xmed = XE = X¯ if
αE ∈ (0, α¯] (42)
wE(αE) ∈
»
wLSE (αE), w
E
«
(43)
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Proof. When αE ∈ (0, α¯] there are no conflicts of interests between outside investors and the initial
owner, Xmed = XE = X¯. Investors maximize their utility holding α¯l. Their participation constraint
is satisfied when wE ≥ wLSE . Active investors hold α¯l, and are at their most preferred X. Hence they
have no incentive to deviate. No investor is willing to sell shares at a price lower than the maximum
that an excluded investor will pay.
A.3.2 Lemma 6:
Proof. From Section A.3.1 it results that all the possible EOS are characterized by outside investors
who are either liquidity shareholders or blockholders.
Consider an EOS where no blockholders exist. Suppose to the contrary, that there is an equilibrium
with K−wE
1−αE < K, αl,j > 0 and Ul,j > 1. By assumption there are sufficiently many investors in the
market, so there always exist passive shareholders who have a strictly positive demand for shares for
any 0 < Xj ≤ X¯. Hence, the initial owner can increase his utility by decreasing wE , for any αE and
still ensure that there is a (smaller) positive demand by passive investors, ensuring full subscription.
As the demand of the liquidity shareholders is given by equation (5), the initial owner will do this until
K−wE
1−αE > K. Contradiction.
Consider an EOS where blockholders and liquidity shareholders exist. In such a case either block-
holders or liquidity shareholders will have the most binding constraint. We already showed above that
when the liquidity investors participation is more binding then K−wE
1−αE > K. So it is sufficient to show
that this is true when the binding constraint is that of blockholders.
When the blockholders’s participation constraint is more binding given m = 1 the value function
for blockholders given Xmed = Xj is given by :
UnBH1 = R¯Xjα1 +
„
K − K − wE
1− αE
«
α1 − γ
2
X2j σ
2α21 + 1 (44)
By the same logic as for the first part, suppose that there is an equilibrium with K−wE
1−αE < K.
Because α1 ≤ max[αj , α¯] when K−wE1−αE < K, then the participation constraint of the blockholders is
satisfied with strict inequality, i.e. UnBH1 > 1. The initial owner can decrease wE and still satisfy the
constraints and ensure full subscription. Contradiction to the fact that it is an equilibrium.
A.3.3 Proposition 2:
Proof. Before we prove the next proposition, we need a few lemmas which provide expressions for the
value function of the initial owner under the alternative ownership structures that could be obtained.
By Lemma 6, we can drop the requirement for the EOS, that wE < w
E
.
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Lemma 12 Suppose the conditions for the No Conflicts EOS (Corollary 4) are satisfied, and the equilib-
rium of the game is the No Conflicts equilibrium, then the initial owner sets αE = m¯, Xmed = XE = X¯,
wE = w
LS
E and the value function of the Initial Owner is given by:
V NCE = R¯X¯ + 1− γ
2
X¯2m¯2σ2 − m¯K − LS (45)
Proof. By Lemma 7, in any monitoring equilibrium, αE ≥ m¯. By Corollary 4, the No Conflicts EOS
with Xmed = XE = X¯ exists if αE ∈ (0, α¯] and wE ≥ wLSE (αE). Therefore the maximization problem
of the Initial Owner in the No Conflicts equilibrium is:
max
αE ,wE
UE = (R¯X¯ +K)αE − γ
2
X¯2α2Eσ
2 + 1− wE − m¯K (46)
s.t wE ≥ wLSE (αE) (47)
αE ∈ [m¯, α¯] (48)
The initial owner’s utility is decreasing in the wealth invested, wE . Hence he chooses wE such that
it satisfies the participation constraint of the liquidity investors, (47), at equality. Inserting it in the
initial owner’s objective function we obtain:
R¯X¯ + 1− γ
2
X¯2α2Eσ
2 − m¯K − LS (49)
This expression is decreasing in αE . Hence the initial owner will retain just enough shares to satisfy the
monitoring constraint with equality: αE = m¯. Inserting αE = m¯ in the initial owners utility function,
we have expression (45).
Let b =
`
max
ˆ
α¯,min
ˆ
1
2
,max [αˆ(1), α˜(1)]
´˜´
+ η.
Lemma 13 Suppose the conditions of the Initial Owner EOS are satisfied (Lemma 9), and the equilib-
rium of the game is an Initial Owner equilibrium, then Xmed = XE < X¯, wE = w
E
E, αE = max[m¯, b],
and the value function of the Initial Owner is given by:
V EE = R¯XE + 1− γ
2
X2E max[m¯, b]
2σ2 − m¯K − E = R¯
2
γσ2
„
1
max[m¯, b]
− 1
2
«
+ 1− m¯K − E (50)
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as for the proof of Lemma 12 using Lemmas 7 and 9.
Detailed proof is available upon request.
Let c = max[αˇ(n) + η, m¯].
Lemma 14 Suppose the conditions of the n-Blockholder EOS are satisfied (Lemma 10 and Corollary
3) and the equilibrium of the game is an n Blockholder equilibrium with Xmed = X1, the initial owner
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sets αE = c, wE = w
n
E and the value function of the Initial Owner is given by:
V nE = R¯X1 + 1− m¯K − γ
2
X21σ
2(c2 + α1 − α1c) (51)
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as for the proof of Lemma 12 and it applies Lemmas 7
and 10. Detailed proof is available upon request.
Lemma 15 Suppose the conditions for the Liquidity Shareholder EOS are satisfied and there exists a
Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium with monitoring. Then, αE = max(α¯ + η¯, m¯), wE = w
LS
E and the
value function of the Initial Owner is given by:
V LSE ≡ R¯X¯ + 1− m¯K − γ
2
X¯2σ2(max[m¯, α¯+ η¯])2 − LS (52)
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as for the proof of Lemma 12 and it applies Lemmas 7
and 11. Detailed proof is available upon request.
Define m¯RCNC and m¯
S
NC the values of m¯ such that when m¯ is smaller than m¯
RC
NC the initial owner
prefers monitoring to not raising capital and m¯SNC the value of m¯ such that the initial owner prefers
monitoring rather than selling the firm (i.e. V NCE ≥ V NME whenever m¯ ≤ min
`
m¯RCNC , m¯
S
NC
´
).
m¯RCNC ≡
q
K
`
K + 2X¯2γσ2
´−K
X¯2γσ2
(53)
m¯SNC ≡
p
2R¯γσ2X¯3 +K2 −K
X¯2γσ2
(54)
We are now ready to prove the proposition. We solve the game by backward induction. The initial
owner chooses αE and wE , anticipating the EOS. His problem can be broken into the following: (1)
αE ∈ [m¯, α¯], (2) αE ∈ (α¯, 1], (3) αE ∈ [0, m¯].
We first describe the beliefs on the EOS and the corresponding value functions in each interval.
Case (1). By Corollary 4 there exists a No Conflicts EOS whenever wE ≥ wLSE . Hence in this interval
the beliefs of all players on the EOS are the No Conflicts EOS. Now, if wE < w
LS
E , for any possible X
there exists a No Trade EOS where all investors believe that no one else will participate, and we assume
that the belief is on the No Trade EOS. The initial owner’s value function is given by equation (45)
when wE ≥ wLSE and by the no trade value function, V NTE = 1 in case wE < wLSE .
Case (2). By Lemmas 9, 10 and 11 the possible EOS in this interval are the Initial Owner, the n
Blockholder or the Liquidity Shareholder ones if wE ≥ wjE where j = {IO, n, LS} depending on the
sub-interval within [α¯, 1]. It is easy to see that if α¯ < b, and as long as αˇ(1) ≥ 1
2
, the interval [α¯, 1]
can be partitioned into the three types of EOS, and we will assume that the IO EOS is in the partition
[ 1
2
, 1] regardless of b. If αˇ(1) < 1
2
, then there always exists an n sufficiently large such that αˇ(n) ≥ 1
2
so that we always have a blockholder equilibrium when αE ≤ 12 . On the other hand if α¯ ≥ 12 then
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there is only the IO EOS in the interval [α¯, 1]. Again if wE < w
j
E for the corresponding sub interval,
we assume a No Trade EOS and hence V NTE = 1 . Thus, e.g. if an Initial Owner EOS exists the initial
owner sets αE = max[m¯,
1
2
] = 1
2
as m¯ ≤ α¯ and his value function, V EE is given by equation (50) setting
b = 1
2
. If an n Blockholder EOS exists, Lemma 14 shows that the initial owner’s utility is decreasing
in αE . Observe that for an n Blockholder equilibrium to exist α˜(n) > α¯. Hence c = α˜(n) + η and
the value function V nE is given by (51). If a Liquidity Shareholders EOS arises, Lemma 15 shows that
αE = max[α¯+ η¯, m¯] = α¯+ η¯. Hence the value function V
LS
E is given by equation (52).
Case (3). In this interval Proposition 1 applies. The initial owner’s value function is V NME = max
ˆ
1, R¯X¯ −K + 1˜.
The initial owner will choose αE to maximize his value function across the intervals (1)–(3) above.
First consider Case (2), ignoring V NTE for the moment: It is easy to see from (50) that V
E
E |αE=b <
V EE |αE=m¯ = V NCE . Hence the initial owner is better off in a No Conflicts equilibrium than in an
Initial Owner equilibrium. If an n-Blockholder EOS exists, it is easy to see from equation (51) that
V nE |α1<m¯ < V nE |α1=m¯. V nE |α1=m¯ < V NCE iff
1
α1
„
1 + αE − α
2
E
α1
«
<
2
α¯
− m¯
2
α¯2
which is always true as m¯ ≤ α¯ ≤ αE . Hence the initial owner is better off in a No Conflicts equilibrium
than in an n-Blockholder equilibrium. If a Liquidity Shareholder EOS exists then by Lemma 15,
V LSE |αE>α¯ < V EE |αE=m¯ = V NCE . Hence the initial owner is better off in a No Conflicts equilibrium than
in an Liquidity Shareholders equilibrium.
Now consider Case (3): The initial owner’s value function is V NME = max
`
1, R¯X¯ −K + 1´. Hence
he prefers to monitor iff V NCE ≥ V NME , i.e. iff V NCE ≥ R¯X¯ −K + 1 and V NCE ≥ 1.
This first condition is satisfied when m¯ ∈ [c, m¯SNC ], where c < 0. Hence V NCE ≥ R¯X¯ − K + 1,
whenever m¯ < m¯SNC .
16 The second condition, V NCE ≥ 1, is satisfied when m¯ ∈ [d, m¯RCNC ], where d < 0.
Finally, the No Trade equilibrium gives the same value to the initial owner as not raising capital, so
under the conditions of the proposition, the No Conflicts equilibrium is preferred by the initial owner.
A.3.4 Proposition 3:
Proof.
Define as m¯RC1,n (n) and m¯
RC
2,n (n) the first two biggest solutions of the equation V
n
E = 1 and m¯
S
1,n(n)
16Note that as  is a very small number we just consider a strict inequality.
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and m¯S2,n(n) the two biggest solutions of the equation V
n
E = R¯X¯ + 1−K. Let:
m¯E1 (n) ≡
λ(1 + λ) + n(1− λ)
“
1−p8(3n− 1)λ2 + (4− 24n)λ”
11n2(1− λ)2 + (n(1− λ)− (1 + λ))2 (55)
m¯E2 (n) ≡
λ(1 + λ) + n(1− λ)
“
1 +
p
8(3n− 1)λ2 + (4− 24n)λ
”
11n2(1− λ)2 + (n(1− λ)− (1 + λ))2 (56)
m¯E1 (n) and m¯
E
2 (n) are the two monitoring costs for which the initial owner is indifferent between being
in a n Blockholder equilibrium or in an Initial Owner equilibrium holding the majority of the shares, i.e.
V nE = V
E
E
`
αE =
1
2
´
. For monitoring cost values within this interval [m¯E1 (n), m¯
E
2 (n)] the initial owner
prefers to be in an n Blockholder equilibrium.
Following the steps of the proof of Proposition 2, we break up the initial owner’s maximization
problem into the following intervals of αE : (1) αE ∈
ˆ
m¯, 1
2
˜
; (2) αE ∈ ( 12 , 1]; (3) αE ∈ [0, m¯]. We first
describe the beliefs on the EOS and the corresponding value functions in each of these intervals.
Case (1). By Lemma 7, m = 1. Then all investors anticipate monitoring in the last stage. We assume
the following beliefs about the EOS at date 1: if wE ≥ wnE then the anticipated EOS is the n Blockholder
equilibrium which exists by Lemma 10. By Lemma 14 in such a case the initial owner’s value function,
V nE , is given by equation (51). If wE < w
n
E then the EOS is the No Trade EOS with corresponding
value function V NTE .
Case (2). By Lemma 7, m = 1. In this interval whenever wE ≥ wEE there exists an Initial Owner EOS
(Lemma 9). By Lemma 13, he minimizes αE , i.e. αE =
1
2
and his value function becomes:
V EE =
3
2
R¯2
γσ2
+ 1− m¯K − E (57)
Case (3). This is the same as Proposition 2, Case 3 and generates a value of V NME .
Now we show that the conditions under which the initial owner chooses αE = m¯, i.e. Case (1).
We first check that V nE ≥ V EE
`
αE =
1
2
´
. This occurs when:
1
α1
„
1− m¯
2
α1
+ m¯
«
≥ 3 (58)
This condition is satisfied iff:
1 + m¯−√1 + 2m¯− 11m¯2
6
≤ α1 ≤ 1 + m¯+
√
1 + 2m¯− 11m¯2
6
(59)
Substituting α1 we obtain that V
E
n ≥ V EE iff m¯ ∈ [m¯E1,n, m¯E2,n].
Second we check that V En ≥ V ENM :
(i) V En ≥ 1 iff:
n(1− λ)λR¯2 + m¯ `m¯n2(1− λ)2R¯2 − n(1− λ)(λm¯+ m¯+ 1)R¯2 + 2Kγ(λm¯+ m¯− λ)2σ2´ < 0 (60)
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The left hand side is a third degree inequality which goes from −∞ to∞, and it is positive at m¯ = λ
1+λ
.
Note also that when m¯ = 1
2
, the left hand side can be either positive or negative. Hence of the 3
potential roots for which the left hand side is equal to 0, we are interested for the two biggest ones
which are defined as m¯RC1,n and m¯
RC
2,n and the negative values are between these two values, that is
m¯RC1,n < m¯ < m¯
RC
2,n .
(ii) V En ≥ R¯X¯ −K + 1 iff:
2α¯Kγ(1 + λ)2σ2m¯3 +
`
R¯2
`
2(1 + λ)2 − α¯n(1− λ)(λ+ 1)´− n(1− λ)− 2α¯Kγ `3λ2 + 4λ+ 1´σ2´ m¯2
+
`
α¯
`
2Kγλ(3λ+ 2)σ2 − nR¯2(1− λ)´− 4R¯2λ(1 + λ)´ m¯+ λ `2λR¯2 + α¯ `nR¯2(1− λ)− 2Kγλσ2´´ < 0 (61)
The left hand side has the same features of the left hand side of condition (60). Hence this condition is
satisfied when m¯S1,n < m¯ < m¯
S
2,n where m¯
S
1 and m¯
S
2 are the biggest solutions of the left hand side set
equal to zero.
A.3.5 Corollary 1:
Proof. This is special case of Proposition 3.
A.3.6 Proposition 4:
Proof. The initial owner’s value function has a maximum for n = n∗. As m¯ > λ
1+λ
, n > 0.
A.3.7 Proposition 5:
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 2. Let
m¯RCE ≡ 1
2
„
1− R¯X¯
K
«
− R¯
2
4Kγσ2
+
q
16KR¯2γσ2 +
`
R¯2 + 2γσ2
`
R¯X¯ −K´´2
4Kγσ2
(62)
m¯SE ≡ − R¯
2
4Kγσ2
+
R¯
p
R¯2 + 16Kγσ2
4Kγσ2
(63)
We break up the maximization problem of the initial owner into the following cases: (1) αE ∈
[max[b+η, m¯], 1] = [m¯, 1] (2) αE ∈ [0, m¯]. We first describe the beliefs on the EOS and the corresponding
value functions in each interval.
Case (1). By Lemma 7, m = 1. Then all investors anticipate monitoring in the last stage. We assume
that in this interval the initial owner EOS is anticipated as long as wE satisfies condition (33) (Lemma
9). Lemma 13 implies then that: αE = m¯, wE = w
E
E and the initial owner’s value function, V
E
E , is
given by equation (50). Otherwise when wE < w
E
E we assume there is no trade and V
NT
E = 1.
Case (2). This case is the same as in Proposition 2, Case (3). The initial owner’s value function is
V NME = max[R¯X¯ −K + 1, 1].
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Maximizing across intervals of Cases (1) and (2) the initial owner will choose αE = m¯ as long as
V EE ≥ max(V NME , V NTE ) = V NME . This occurs when m¯ ≤ min
ˆ
m¯RCE , m¯
S
E
˜
.
When m¯ >
ˆ
1
2
, α¯
˜
this is the unique equilibrium (under the conditions of the proposition), induced
by the uniqueness of the Initial Owner EOS.
A.3.8 Corollary 2:
Proof. It follows directly from Propositions 5 and 3.
A.3.9 Proposition 6:
Proof. Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2, we break up the maximization problem
into the following intervals of αE : (1) αE ∈
ˆ
m¯,min
`
α˜(n), 1
2
´´
; (2) αE ∈
ˆ
α˜E(n),min
ˆ
αˆ(n), 1
2
˜˜
; (3)
αE ∈
`
min
ˆ
αˆ(n), 1
2
˜
, 1
˜
; (4) αE ∈ [0, m¯). As before, we first describe the beliefs on the EOS in each
interval and the corresponding value functions.
Case (1). By Lemma 7, m = 1. All investors anticipate monitoring in the last stage. We will assume
the following beliefs about the EOS in date 1: if wE ≥ wLSE then the anticipated EOS is the Liquidity
Shareholder EOS which exists by Lemma 11. If wE < w
LS
E the project does not go ahead and the initial
owner gets value V NTE . By Lemma 15, if a Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium exists the initial owner’s
value function, V LSE , is given by equation (52).
Case (2). If wE ≥ wnE there exists an n-Blockholder EOS by Lemma 14 and Corollary 3. The proof
of Lemma 14 shows that the initial owner’s minimizes αE and the initial owner’s utility function is
continuous between these two intervals of αE and is given by expression (51). Hence he prefers to
minimize αE , i.e. αE = α˜(n). The value function is therefore given by V
n
E , expression (51) with
c = α˜(n)+η. If wE < w
n
E then the belief on the EOS is the No Trade EOS, with value function V
NT
E .
17
Case (3). In this case the unique EOS is the Initial Owner EOS for wE ≥ wEE . Using the proof of
Lemma 13 we know that the initial owner minimizes αE , i.e. αE = d ≡ min[αˆ(n), 12 ] and the value
function is given by V EE . If wE < w
E
E the belief on the EOS is the No Trade EOS, with value function
V NTE .
Case (4). See Proposition 2, Case 3. The initial owner’s value function is given by V NME .
We now show that the initial owner chooses αE = m¯, i.e. a Liquidity Shareholder EOS. This is true
whenever V LSE ≥ max(V EE , V NME , V nE , V NTE ). Because the initial owner’s value function is decreasing in
αE , V
E
E |αE=d < V EE |αE=α¯ = V LSE . Hence the liquidity shareholder ownership structure of Case (1) is
preferred over the Case (3) one. Second, as in the proof of Proposition 2, V nE |αE=α˜(n) < V nE |αE=m¯ <
17In this interval there can be also an Initial Owner EOS if n > 1 and wE ≥ wEE . In such a case the
proof that shows that the initial owner prefers the Liquidity Shareholder EOS follow the same steps as
Case (3).
55
V LSE . Hence Case (1) is preferred over Case (2). Moreover V
NM
E ≥ V NTE . Hence we only need to check
that V LSE ≥ V NME and this is true iff m¯ ≤ min
`
m¯RCNC , m¯
S
NC
´
.
A.3.10 Proposition 7
Proof. When the initial owner can raise an amount of capital I ≥ K and invest the remaining amount
in the risk free asset his objective function becomes αE(XR¯+K + I −K)− γ2α2EX2σ2 −wE − m¯. The
objective function of the investors is instead:
(1− αi I − wE
αI
) + αi
ˆ
XR¯+K + I −K˜− γ
2
α2iX
2σ2 (64)
Repeating the same steps of Propositions 2, 5, 6, 3, we obtain the optimal wE . Inserting it in the initial
owner objective function, we obtain that the initial owner’s objective function is decreasing in I.
A.3.11 Comparitive Statics
Lemma 16 Suppose αE ≤ 12 and n ≤ 12η (a) ∂α˜∂λ = 1−2nη(1+λ)2 > 0. (b) ∂αˆ∂λ ≥ 0. (c) ∂αˇ∂λ = 1−2α¯n(1+λ)2 > 0.
(d)
∂V nE
∂λ
< 0, (e) ∂α1
∂λ
= − 1−2αE
n(1−λ)2 < 0
Proof. The proof of parts (a) and (d) follow directly from the study of the derivative
(b) αˆ(n) ≡ max[αˆ1(n), αˆ2(n)]. ∂αˆ1(n)∂λ = − 2(n−2)(n(1−λ)−2(1+λ))2 . This is positive if n < 2, that is when
αˆ1(n) < 1/2. αˆ2(n) is defined as the threshold such that if αE ≤ αˆ(n) then wEE ≤ wnE when X1 = X¯.
This condition can be rewritten as:
R¯XE ≥ R¯X¯ − γ
2
X¯2σ2α1 (65)
∂α1
∂λ
< 0. The above condition is less binding for higher λ and hence ∂αˆ2
∂λ
> 0.
(c) The sign of
∂V nE
∂λ
is the same of the expression 1
α1
“
1 + m¯− m¯
α1
”
. This is always negative as
m (1− 2n (1− λ))− λ+m2 (1 + λ) < 0.
Lemma 17 (a) ∂α¯
∂X¯
< 0; (b) ∂αˆ
∂X¯
≥ 0; (c) ∂αˇ
∂X¯
= 1−2α¯n
(1+λ)2
< 0; (d)
∂V nE
∂X¯
= 0,
∂VNME
∂X¯
≥ 0, ∂VNCE
∂X¯
=
∂V LSE
∂X¯
< 0.
Lemma 18 Suppose αE ≤ 12 : (a) ∂α˜∂n > 0; (b) ∂αˆ∂n > 0; (c) ∂αˇ∂n > 0; (d)
∂V nE
∂n
< 0; (e) ∂α1
∂n
< 0;
(f)
∂wnE
∂n
> 0.
Lemma 19 (a)
∂VNME
∂K
≥ 0; (b) ∂V iE
∂K
< 0 with i = {NC,n,E, LS}; (c) ∂w
j
E
∂K
> 0 with j = {NC,n,E, LS};
Proof. Proof of Lemmas 17-19 follows from the study of the sign of the derivatives.
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